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*The Concept of Anger in English and Russian: a Comparative Analysis of  
Corpus-Based Data and Data Collected from Native Speakers*

*Koncept ljutnje u engleskom i ruskom jeziku: usporedba korpusnih podataka i podataka  
prikupljenih od izvornih govornika*

*Концепт злости в английском и русском языках: сопоставительный анализ по данным,  
собранным на основе корпусов и по данным анкетирования носителей языка*

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## Аннотация

В данной дипломной работе рассматривается концепт *злости* в русском языке и концепт *anger* в английском языке с точки зрения когнитивной этнолингвистики. В этой работе мы стараемся ответить на вопрос какими точно способами концептуализация *злости* отличается в русской и американской культурах. Таким образом, мы попытались доказать, что связь между грамматическими конструкциями и концептуализацией данной эмоции действительна. Иными словами, цель этой работы – обнаружить и сравнить культурно специфические аспекты народной модели *злости* в русском и английском языках. Для достижения этой цели с помощью семантико-грамматического анализа мы проанализировали, как предложения из Национального корпуса русского языка и Корпуса современного американского английского, так и ответы на анкету, состоящую из следующего открытого вопроса: *Что по Вашему мнению является настоящей злостью?*. Анкету заполняли носители американского английского и русского языков. Этнолингвистика исследует проявления культуры в языке, поэтому мы провели как исследование корпуса, так и анкету с носителями языка. Носители языка имеют важнейшую роль в когнитивной этнолингвистике, так как язык – носитель культуры. В течении анализа, мы обнаружили, что существительное *злость/anger* появляется в трех случаях: существительное *злость/anger* с премодификатором, существительное *злость/anger* как часть словосочетания, и существительное *злость/anger* с глаголом. Мы проанализировали существительное *злость/anger* как часть словосочетания и с глаголом. Сочетание существительного *злость/anger* и глагола мы разделили на две группы: группу, в которой *злость* участвует в схеме событий, и группу, в которой *злость* не участвует в схеме событий, а является частью абстрактного пространства. Мы проанализировали как метафорические, так и неметафорические выражения. Полученные грамматические категории мы включили в этапы сценария злости по Кёвечешу. Результаты исследования показали, что американцы говорят о причине и попытке контроля злости больше, чем русские, в то время как русские сосредоточены как на воплощение злости и его возмездие, так и на нетипичные для сценария злости этапы. Концептуализация злости в двух культурах отличается и в нетипичных для сценария злости этапах – в английском появляется понятие контролируемой злости, а в русском добавляются еще злость как способ действия и злость как энергия. Более того, в русском языке для выражения злости намного чаще используется схема абстрактного пространства, а в

английском схема событий. Этап сценария злости, обозначающий потерю контроля над злостью, является самым проблематичным, так как в исследовании корпуса он лучше разработан в русском языке, а в анкете он лучше разработан в английском. Мы предполагаем, что причиной этому является фокус носителей русского языка на воплощение и возмездие злости.

**Key words:** anger, cognitive ethnolinguistics, semantic-grammatical analysis, cross-cultural variation, cognitive model, emotion language

**Ключевые слова:** злость, когнитивная этнолингвистика, семантико-грамматический анализ, межкультурная вариация, когнитивная модель, язык эмоций

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## 1. Introduction

Culture-specific concepts, being more or less obvious indicators of languages differing not only in lexemes and grammar, but in the way they reflect culture in language, are an intriguing topic for linguistic research. This case study, however, was motivated by cross-cultural misunderstandings that took place not because of the failure to understand a culture-specific concept, but because of the concept that was thought to be universal. The result of these situations was the idea that universal concepts incorporate culture-specific elements. This notion is widely discussed in works of Bartmiński and Kövecses, which will be used as the theoretical basis.

In order to examine the idea of culture-specific elements in universal concepts, this paper deals with emotion language, in particular with the concept of anger. The paper tries to answer the question of how exactly the conceptualization of anger varies in American and in Russian cultures from the point of view of cognitive ethnolinguistics. In this way the study attempts to show that there is a relationship between grammatical constructions we use to talk about anger and the way anger is conceptualized. Therefore, the main goal of the study is to detect and compare the culture-specific aspects of the folk model of anger in English and in Russian.

The culture-specific elements of the concept of anger will be investigated by means of Radden and Dirven's semantic-grammatical analysis of the sentences excerpted from the Corpus of Contemporary American English and the Russian National Corpus, as well as data collected from native speakers of English and Russian via a questionnaire. The results will be incorporated into Kövecses' anger scenario and compared. We expect to find differences in the frequency of specific types of event schemas, as well as differences within the anger scenario.

I believe that the reconstruction of the linguistic worldview is an interesting and noteworthy insight into the conceptualization of universal concepts with culture-specific elements like anger, because it sheds light on important aspects of anger, which may otherwise be overlooked. This study is meant to complement previous research on anger from the point of view of cognitive linguistics and present some new insights about language- and culture-specific elements of the concept of anger in American English and Russian.

## 2. Language, mind and culture

To start, let us explain why the perspective of cognitive linguistics and ethnolinguistics has been adopted. Cognitive linguistics encompasses the view that “as human products, the words and grammatical structures of a language reflect the physical, psychological and social experiences of its human creators.” (Radden and Dirven 2007, XI) According to Radden and Dirven, “a part of the cognitive approach to grammar is to detect the motivation underlying grammatical structures,” (2007, XI) which is exactly what this paper strives to do. More precisely:

The main functions of language are to enable people to symbolize their experiences in a perceptible form and to communicate them to others. In expressing their thoughts, speakers constantly need to decide which words and grammatical constructions to use. Both the inventories of words and constructions of a language provide a set of options which the speaker has to choose from in communicating her thoughts. A cognitive approach to grammar is therefore ‘usage-based’: it looks at the structural choices available and the speaker’s reasons for choosing one alternative over other.

(Radden and Dirven 2007, XI)

This paper claims that one of the reasons for choosing one form over another is rooted in culture. Various linguists and researchers have engaged in discussing and emphasizing the importance of culture in language, like Ivir, Bartmiński, Wierzbicka, etc. In an article about translating culture, Ivir claims that “language and culture are inextricably interwoven” and that “the integration of an element into a culture (and into the conceptual framework of its members as individuals) cannot be said to have been achieved unless and until the linguistic expression of that element has been integrated into the language of that culture.” (Ivir 1987, 35)

In his book *Aspects of Cognitive Ethnolinguistics*, Bartmiński meticulously writes about ethnolinguistics as a branch of linguistics which “deals with manifestations of culture in language” and “attempts to discover the traces of culture in the very fabric of language, in word meanings, phraseology, word formation, syntax and text structure.” (Bartmiński 2009, 10) This paper embraces Kłoskowska’s definition of culture as “a set of norms and beliefs, which exist in people’s minds and pertain to the recommended courses of action and proper judgements” (as quoted in Bartmiński 2009, 9) from which we can conclude that culture is

embedded in language as its inalienable constituent, i.e. culture is not “‘extra-linguistic’ but ‘ad-linguistic’: [it] co-create[s] the context of linguistic texts.” (2009, 9) Thus, as the speaking subject and carrier of language and culture, *Homo loquens* has a central role in cognitive ethnolinguistics. (Bartmiński 2009) As Pitkin put it: “And language is the carrier of the human culture, by which mankind continually produces and contemplates itself, a reflection of our species-being.” (Pitkin 1972, 3)

Because *Homo loquens* projects language with the worldview entrenched in it, this study encompasses both the analysis of corpus data and the analysis of the data collected from native speakers. As ethnolinguistics deals with an anthropocentric linguistic worldview which is “an aspect of national language, used by an average speaker of a natural language: the worldview reflects the speaker’s needs, aspirations and mentality,” (Bartmiński 2009, 24) it would be virtually impossible to conduct an ethnolinguistic study about a concept without asking native speakers about their interpretation of it. In other words, everyday language should be analyzed in order to find elements of a speaker’s worldview (corpus analysis) and we should also ask speakers about their worldview so that we could analyze language about it (questionnaire data). The two should complement each other and form a cohesive representation of a linguistic reality of native speakers.

Now we come to the question of the meaning of a word. As stated above, language cannot be analyzed without taking culture into account. Hence, meaning cannot be discussed without its cultural component. Bartmiński (2009) and Wierzbicka (1992) both highlight the embeddedness of culture in language and insist on the importance of the cultural component in the meaning of a word. They point out the differences between encyclopedic and dictionary definition and argue that both lack the folk “knowledge about the word” (Žic-Fuchs 1991, 75). Wierzbicka states that “scientific definitions (...) do not represent the native speaker’s concept” because they try to be “universal and to reflect the knowledge accumulated by mankind as a whole,” (Wierzbicka 1996, 338) and languages are not universal. On the contrary, each language “reflects experience of a particular part of mankind, united by a common culture and a common existential framework (...).” (1996, 338) Lakoff defines folk theories or folk models as theories, either implicit or explicit, about every important aspect of the lives of ordinary people, without any expertise. (Lakoff 1987, 118) The main difference between a folk definition and a scientific definition of a concept is that “a scientific picture of the world does not depend on the language used to describe it.” (Apresyan 1992 as quoted in Wierzbicka 1996, 338)



In other words, lexical meaning is comprised of a number of different kinds of meanings: the core with its superordinate hyperonymus category, encyclopedic meaning and both lexical and cultural connotations, which comprise the “cognitive definition.” (Bartmiński 2009) The cognitive definition aims to include extralinguistic phenomena, such as customs and beliefs, as a part of meaning. (Bartmiński 2009) More precisely, it “aims to portray the way in which an entity is viewed by the speakers of a language, to represent socio-culturally established and linguistically entrenched knowledge, its categorization and valuation.” (Bartmiński 2009, 67) This is the approach to meaning that this paper advocates. Another question that arises is that of cultural universals.

As mentioned by Bartmiński (2009), various linguists have written about the phenomenon of meaning by referring to the universality and cultural variation of concepts by using different terms and definitions. While Wierzbicka has found differences between languages and cultures in cultural ‘keywords’ and Fleischer in ‘collective symbols’, Pisarek has found them in ‘leading symbols’ and Kövecses in emotion concepts. (cf. Bartmiński 2009, 27).

Wierzbicka addresses the issue of the definition and “fuzziness” of concepts which started with Wittgenstein’s idea of “family resemblance” and led to “prototype semantics.” She states that defining words beyond the dictionary definition is too vast to be practical. (Wierzbicka 1992) Nevertheless, she argues that such an endeavor is possible if we establish “the basic stock of human concepts – universal semantic primitives – out of which thoughts and complex concepts are constructed and in terms of which all complex concepts, in any language, can be explained.” (1992, 25) Wierzbicka writes about emotion, as well, quoting Solomon who claims that “variation in emotional life is a very real part of cross-cultural differences, and not only in the more obvious variations in circumstances and expression,” (Solomon 1984 as quoted in Wierzbicka 1992) and adds that in order to investigate this idea, we need to “turn to a piece by piece investigation of the concepts that make up our various emotions and their complex permutations, side by side with more holistic investigations of a number of other societies (...).” (Solomon 1984 as quoted in Wierzbicka 1992, 135)

Wierzbicka investigates this issue by using semantic primitives, which constitute “the conceptual content of particular emotion words in particular languages” (Kövecses 2000, 8), while this case study turns to Kövecses’ cross-cultural variation in the conceptualization of emotion and Radden and Dirven’s cognitive English grammar.

### 3. The model of anger

Many studies describe emotion concepts as scripts, scenarios or models. (Kövecses 2000) For example, Wierzbicka (1992) gives a script for anger, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) present a list of cognitive metaphors for anger in English, Bartmiński (2009) writes about stereotypes<sup>1</sup> and Kövecses (2000a) gives a scenario for anger. Wierzbicka (1995) states that “the emotion prototypes are different cross-culturally, but the semantic primitives with which these differences are expressed can be, and are, universal.” (Kövecses 2000, 15) This paper acknowledges this particular point of view, but instead of semantic primitives, it considers Kövecses’ (2000a) anger scenario.

In Kövecses’ view, the social constructionist and universalist approaches to emotion and emotion language should complement each other. He states that “some aspects of emotion language and emotion concepts are universal and clearly related to the psychological functioning of the body” (Kövecses 2000a, 183) and once they are singled out, we are left with “the very significant differences in emotion language and concepts [that] can be explained by reference to differences in cultural knowledge and pragmatic discourse functions that work according to divergent culturally defined rules and scenarios.” (2000a, 183) The problem with the claim that embodiment is the basis for universality of emotions is that it cannot simultaneously account for culture-specificity. Kövecses, on the contrary, explains that the cultural background accounts for variations present in the perception of our bodily sensations. He, therefore, writes about universal elements and the elements of cultural variation in the conceptualization of anger.

It is necessary to determine the universal skeleton of anger in order to consider culture-specific elements. Kövecses argues that there are certain linguistic and cognitive tools which are used to express and describe emotions in the majority of languages and that these tools account for the universal element of emotions. Thus, “cultural models of anger and its counterparts are the joint products of metaphor, metonymy, (possibly universal) actual physiology and cultural context.” (2000a, 162) In a later article, he includes related concepts into the model of anger. (Kövecses 2014, 16) Each cultural model consists of its “schematic basic structure”. (Kövecses 2000a, 162) In the case of anger, this schematic basic structure is the following scenario: cause of emotion → emotion → attempt at control → loss of control

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<sup>1</sup> Bartmiński does not write about emotions, but about the stereotype of sun, mother, house, homeland, politics and fate.

→ response. (2000a, 129) In other words, the prototypical description of the folk model of anger is comprised of a cause, which then produces emotion, we then try to control the emotion and usually fail, which results in a response. In conclusion, we can use universal tools such as metonymy, metaphor, actual physiology and cultural context in order to extract elements which would fit the basic anger scenario. Each of these “tools” has a prototypical example which appears in both English and Russian cultures, like the container metaphor. (Kövecses 2000b) Kövecses proposes the following areas as potential sources for cross-cultural variation: “the content of prototypical cultural models of emotions, the general content and specific key concepts of the broader cultural context, the range of conceptual metaphors and metonymies and emphasis on metaphor versus metonymy, or the other way around.” (Kövecses 2000b, 165) The methodology used in his study can provide insight into all of the above, emphasizing the content of the prototypical cultural model of anger.

The following section describes the existing model of anger in American English, and it gives insight into previous studies dealing with culture variations of anger in English and in Russian. It does not provide the model of anger in Russian because it has not yet been systematically described in the sense of Lakoff and Kövecses (1987), but it gives some important insight into the model drawn from previous research.

#### *The folk model of anger in American English*

Lakoff and Kövecses (1987) propose a prototypical cognitive model of anger in the sense of the naïve or folk understanding of anger in English with the idea that “the metaphors and metonymies associated with anger converge on and constitute the model, with different metaphors and metonymies mapping onto different parts of the model.” (Kövecses 2000b, 160) The prototypical scenario of anger in American English is as follows:

Stage 1: Offending event or cause of emotion

Wrongdoer offends self.<sup>2</sup>

Wrongdoer is at fault.

The offending event displeases self.

The intensity of the offense outweighs the intensity of the retribution, thus creating an imbalance.

The offense causes anger to come into existence.

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<sup>2</sup> Self is the experiencer.

Stage 2: Anger or emotion

Anger exists.

Self experiences physiological effects (heat, pressure, agitation).

Anger exerts a counterforce in an attempt an act of retribution.

Stage 3: Attempt to control anger

Self exerts a counterforce in an attempt to control anger.

Stage 4: Loss of control

The intensity of anger goes above limit.

Anger takes control of self.

Self exhibits angry behavior (loss of judgement, aggressive actions).

There is damage to self.

There is danger to the target of anger, in this case, the wrongdoer.

Stage 5: Retribution or response

Self performs retributive act against wrongdoer (this is usually angry behavior).

The intensity of retribution balances the intensity of offense.

The intensity of anger drops to zero.

Anger ceases to exist.

(Lakoff 1987, 400-401)

Another component of the model of anger is metonymy, which begins with the common cultural model of the physiological effects of anger, consisting of three claims:

The physiological effects of anger are increased body heat, increased internal pressure (blood pressure, muscular pressure), agitation, and interference with accurate perception.

As anger increases, its physiological effects increase.

There is a limit beyond which the physiological effects of anger impair normal functioning.

(Lakoff 1987, 381)

The above-mentioned cultural model yields a general metonymic principle for anger: THE PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECT OF AN EMOTION STANDS FOR THE EMOTION. (Lakoff 1987, 382) This principle produces the following system of metonymies for anger in American English: body heat, internal pressure, redness in face and neck area, agitation, interference with

accurate perception. (Lakoff 1987, 382) Lakoff and Kövecses state that “the folk theory of physiological effects (...) forms the basis of the most general metaphor for anger: anger is heat.” (1987, 383) Anger is heat has two versions; ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER and ANGER IS FIRE metaphors, out of which the former is much more elaborated. In the metaphor ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER, heat is applied to fluids and the metaphor is motivated by the heat, internal pressure and the agitation elements of the folk theory, while in the ANGER IS FIRE metaphor, anger is considered to be solid and the metaphor is motivated by heat and redness. (1987, 383) A list of the main metaphors for anger in American English is as follows: ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER, ANGER IS FIRE, ANGER IS INSANITY, ANGER IS AN OPPONENT IN A STRUGGLE, ANGER IS A CAPTIVE ANIMAL, ANGER IS A BURDEN, ANGRY BEHAVIOUR IS AGGRESSIVE ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR, THE CAUSE OF ANGER IS TRESPASSING, THE CAUSE OF ANGER IS PHYSICAL ANNOYANCE, ANGER IS A NATURAL FORCE, AN ANGRY PERSON IS A FUNCTIONING MACHINE, ANGER IS A SOCIAL SUPERIOR. (Kövecses 2000a, 21) We will use the given metonymies and metaphors to help us fit our examples into the anger scenario and we will elaborate some metaphors accordingly. A more detailed view of the given metaphors can be found in Lakoff (1987, 380-397).

Another important part of the folk model of anger is the non-prototypical cases. To determine if an example is prototypical or not, we can use the *but*-test. According to Lakoff and Kövecses, “the word *but* marks a situation counter to expectation.” (Lakoff 1987, 404) Let us take a look at the following sentences:

- a) Max got angry, but he didn't blow his top.
- b) Max got angry, but he blew his top.

In these sentences, “the prototypical scenario defines what is to be expected,” so “the unacceptable sentences with *but* fit the prototypical scenario and define expected situations,” (Lakoff 1987, 404) making the sentence b) a prototypical situation: an angry person feels over-the-top pressure, which fits the metaphor WHEN A PERSON EXPLODES, PARTS OF HIM GO UP IN THE AIR (Lakoff 1987, 387) and the fourth stage of the anger scenario - loss of control. If Max was angry, but in the stage 4 he did not lose the control, this would be a non-prototypical situation. As such instances will be of great importance to our analysis; we will give the list of non-prototypical anger scenarios, which is explained below, as a part of the analysis of our data. The full list of non-prototypical anger scenarios with explanations can be found in Lakoff (1987, 401-405). The list of non-prototypical anger scenarios without elaboration is as follows: insatiable anger, frustrated anger, redirected anger, exaggerated

response, controlled response, constructive use, terminating event, spontaneous cessation, successful suppression, controlled reduction, immediate explosion, slow burn, nursing a grudge, the “don’t get mad, get even” anger, indirect cause, cool anger, cold anger, anger with, righteous indignation, wrath and a manipulative use of anger. (Lakoff 1987, 401-405)

#### 4. Previous research

Extensive linguistic research has been done on the notion of anger, as well as on the cultural variation of this emotion. Moreover, linguists have researched the relationship between grammar and metaphor, as well. This section gives an overview of cross-cultural research on anger found in Kövecses (2000a, 164-172) and on the cross-cultural variations of anger in English and Russian by Ogarkova and Soriano. It also focuses on two studies dealing with grammar and metaphor.

##### *The cross-cultural variation of anger in English, Hungarian, Zulu, Japanese and Chinese*

As was already mentioned, Kövecses claims that cultural models can vary in the content of prototypical cultural models, broader cultural context, the range and elaborations of conceptual metaphors and metonymies and in the metonymy versus metaphor frequency. (Kövecses 2000a, 165-172) The claim is based on a number of previous studies. For example, according to Reischauer’s (1964) and Doi’s (1973) study of Japanese, and King’s (1989)<sup>3</sup> study of Chinese, Eastern and Western models of anger vary in content – the Japanese model gives the angry person more chance to control their anger than the English model, and in the Chinese model, expressing anger is less directed at another person as a form of retaliation and more at diverting it to various parts of the body. (Kövecses 2000a, 166) Broader cultural context is of great importance, as well. According to Taylor and Mbense (1998 as quoted in Kövecses 2000a, 169), in Zulu culture an active person is highly valued, which can make an angry person positively evaluated, possibly because of the connection of anger to high activity. On the other hand, in American culture anger has a very negative evaluation because of historical reasons. (Stearns 1994 as quoted in Kövecses 2000a, 169) As for the range of conceptual metaphors, all metaphors for anger in American English can be found in Japanese with the addition of the metaphor ANGER IS HARA, which exists because of the culture-specific concept of *hara*. Another example comes from Zulu, in which anger is associated

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<sup>3</sup> Studies are quoted in Ogarkova and Soriano 2014.

with the heart in the ANGER IS IN THE HEART metaphor. The same metaphors can be elaborated differently. For instance, in both Hungarian and English there is the metaphor ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER, but Hungarians emphasize the head or the brain as the container much more frequently than American speakers do. The range of metonymies can vary like in English and Zulu, where Zulu uses all of the English metonymies with the addition of nausea, illness, etc. Metonymies can be elaborated differently, as well. For example, Chinese culture emphasizes pressure much more than heat in the metonymy THE PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECT OF AN EMOTION STANDS FOR THE EMOTION. Lastly, languages vary with respect to the frequency of metaphors and metonymies they use to express and talk about anger, so English primarily uses metaphors, Zulu metonymies, and in Chinese metonymy has a more important role in the conceptualization of emotions than it has in English.

### *The cross-cultural variation of anger in English and Russian*

After a short overview of the variations of anger in different languages, let us focus on variation in Russian and English. Several studies will be considered: Aneta Pavlenko's *Emotion and the Body in Russian and English*, which includes an overview of Wierzbicka's findings on anger, and *Variations within universals: the metaphorical profile approach and ANGER concept in English, Russian, and Spanish* by Anna Ogarkova and Cristina Soriano.

In her study, Pavlenko (2002) investigates Wierzbicka's claims that the relationship of the body and emotions is more emphasized in Russian than it is in English and that Russian speakers tend to talk about anger using verbs, while English has a higher frequency of adjectives. The two hypotheses were confirmed, proving several claims important for our study. Firstly, "discursive construction of emotion is influenced by linguistic ways of framing emotions prevalent in particular speech communities." (Pavlenko 2002, 235) More specifically, American speakers discuss emotions as states that could be changed by external circumstances, while Russian speakers discuss emotions as embodied actions and processes, which they (probably) brought about themselves. Because of this kind of perception, Russian speakers paid more attention to facial expressions, body language, and external behaviors. (2002, 235) As it will be very interesting to compare our analysis to these results, we will take a closer look at the results that Wierzbicka arrived at in a number of her studies, which are discussed in Pavlenko's article. Wierzbicka found that anger is often conceptualized in Russian as "inner activities in which one engages more or less voluntarily" (2002, 212), while emotions in English are often conceptualized as "passive states caused by external and/or past

causes.” (2002, 212) Furthermore, Wierzbicka emphasizes the relationship of the body and soul in Russian, and body and mind in English – in Russian culture, emotions are a neutral state of being and the absence of emotions indicates the decay of the soul, while in the American culture a neutral state of being is “emotionless composure” (2002, 213) and emotions imply the loss of control.

Ogarkova and Soriano conducted numerous studies involving cross-cultural investigations of anger, out of which *Variations within universals: the metaphorical profile approach and ANGER concept in English, Russian, and Spanish* provides the most interesting conclusions for our analysis, although it investigates British English. Ogarkova and Soriano’s (2014) motivation to research the concept of *anger* stems from the considerable variability of the emotion across cultures, especially in regard to “evaluation, expression and regulation in different cultural groups.” (Ogarkova and Soriano 2014, 94) They draw attention to the lack of interdisciplinarity in the research of emotion, stating that not enough studies rely on the results from previous studies in different fields, like psychology or anthropology. Ogarkova and Soriano investigate three hypotheses, grouping Russian and Spanish in contrast to English. We will refer only to Russian, as this study does not deal with Spanish. Firstly, they hypothesize that Russian metaphors emphasize the negativity of anger to a greater extent than English metaphors. Secondly, they assume that in Russian metaphors, emphasizing controlled expression and regulation of anger would be more salient than in English, and lastly, they propose that metaphors emphasizing somatic and physiological components of anger would be more salient in Russian than in English. (Ogarkova and Soriano 2014, 97) We will explore these hypotheses through the analysis of grammar, rather than metaphors. The embodiment hypothesis is based on the above-mentioned Wierzbicka’s (1992) and Pavlenko’s (2002) follow-up psycholinguistic study, as well as on the results of clinical studies, which showed that, in contrast to American patients, Chinese and Russian depressed patients were more likely to express their emotions in somatic ways, rather than in psychological terms. (e.g. Kleinman and Kleinman (1985); Shiroma and Alarcon (2011); as quoted in Ogarkova and Soriano 2014, 97) The first two hypotheses can be observed in relation to the collectivistic and individualistic nature of the two cultures. There is a “commonly held view that a fundamental way in which culture shapes human behavior is through *self-construal style*, that is, the way in which people define themselves and their relation to others in their environment.” (e.g. Markus and Kitayama (1991); Nisbett et al. (2001) as quoted in Ogarkova and Soriano 2014, 96) According to Ogarkova and Soriano, in cultures considered more



individualistic, such as the American culture, people think of others as independent from each other, i.e. they live by the “independent” self-construal, in which self-expression, self-autonomy and the pursuit of individuality are highly valued. (2014, 96) On the other hand, in Russian culture, which is considered to be more collectivistic, people live by the “interdependent” self-construal style, i.e. they think of themselves as highly interconnected to one another and value the social harmony and belongingness to a group, rather than individuality. (Ogarkova and Soriano 2014, 96) All of the hypotheses were confirmed.

### *Metaphor and grammar*

While Lakoff (1987) and Kövecses (2000) base their studies on lexical approaches, Stanojević (2013) and Glynn (2002) examine the relationship between grammar and metaphor from a semantic-grammatical point of view. They focus on the grammatical structure of metaphorical expressions, which will be the basis for our study of grammatical constructions and their possible metaphorical meanings. While in Stanojević’s (2013) and Glynn’s (2002) studies the starting points are metaphorical expressions, our starting point is grammatical structure.

In his study on the Middle English noun *love*, Stanojević (2013) looks at three levels of semantic-grammatical analysis: noun phrase with head noun *love* and premodifiers, noun phrase with head noun *love* as a part of another noun phrase and noun phrase with head noun *love* in combination with a verb. He concludes that metaphor has a local role in organizing knowledge about the domain LOVE, as there is no single metaphoric conceptualization that appears on all levels of the analysis. (Stanojević 2013, 182) Metaphorical conceptualization is much more frequent on the second and third levels than it is on the first because they express relations, while the first level describes things<sup>4</sup>. This is rooted in nouns expressing things, and verbs expressing relations. Moreover, certain conceptual metaphors correspond to certain stages of emotion scenarios, which also proves the local role of metaphor. Stanojević has found that the force-dynamic and the material world have an important role in describing *love* as an emotion, as they allow the conceptualization of love as an uncontrollable entity and produce the descriptions of the properties of *love*. (Stanojević 2013, 181)

Glynn (2002) researches the grammatical structure of metaphors that include the concepts of *romantic love* and *anger*. He emphasizes the need to combine the lexical and the grammatical structure of metaphor in the research on conceptual metaphor, which arises from

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<sup>4</sup> More about things and relations in the following section.

the hypothesis that “lexis and morpho-syntax are interdependent.” (Glynn 2002, 1) The author concludes that the grammatical analysis reveals “details of conceptual structure that are not visible in lexical analysis” (Glynn 2002, 1) and he shows that “the structure of conceptual metaphors is more complex than is evident from lexical approaches.” (Glynn 2002, 1) Glynn (2002) investigates British English and his methodology is different from the methodology applied in this study, but his study shows that there certainly is a need to incorporate grammar analysis into the research of meaning.

## 5. Radden and Dirven’s Cognitive Grammar

### *Things and relations*

One of the main goals of cognitive grammar is to “describe the conceptual import of grammatical constructs.” (Langacker 1987, 13) If we paraphrase the goal of this research, it investigates the relationship of Russian and American cultures with the concept of *anger*. This can be understood in terms of Langacker’s cognitive grammar, i.e. in terms of things and relations (Langacker 1987). In the sense of our research, things include the concept of *anger* and the members of Russian and American cultures, and relations include the relationship between the members of the cultures and the concept of *anger*. Langacker defines things and relations in terms of predication, i.e. in terms of the semantic poles (the combination of semantic and phonological structure) of any linguistic expression. (Langacker 1987, 97) Thus, “a nominal predication designates a thing, while a relational predication designates either an atemporal relation or a process.” (1987, 183) Thing is abstract, it does not refer to physical objects, but to cognitive events, and it functions as a noun. (Langacker 1978, 183) A process is categorized as a verb and it refers to “the temporal evolution of a situation” thought time. (1987, 244) On the other hand, atemporal relations designate relations between things and lack the temporal evolution of a situation. They are categorized as “adjectives, adverbs, prepositions, and similar classes.” (1987, 214) We will discuss relations in terms of Radden and Dirven’s cognitive grammar. (2007) Relations can be understood in terms of situations, i.e. in the sense of “events that happen or states that things are in.” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 47) Situations include relation, participants, grounding elements and setting elements. Participants and grounding elements are the obligatory aspect of every situation, while setting elements are optional. Being obligatory, participants, grounding elements, and relations form a conceptual core, while subject, objects, complements and verb phrases respectively form a

grammatical core. Conceptual entities which are categorized as subjects and objects and which “form part of the conceptual core” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 47) are the participants of a situation, while complements refer to the grounding elements which give information about the situation necessary to understand the sentence. Setting elements provide additional information about the situation, such as the time and place of an event, reasons, causes, conditions of the events, etc., and have the form of adjuncts in the structure of a sentence. (Radden and Dirven 2007, 50) During the analysis of corpora examples, it became obvious that *anger* is not represented only as a participant in a situation, but it also frequently appears as a setting element. For this reason, in terms of relations, we will explore both the event schemas and the non-participant roles which include *anger*.

### *Situations*

As mentioned above, the noun *anger* usually appears in one of two roles: it can either be a participant or a non-participant in a situation. Event schemas are the “types of situations which are characterized by a unique configuration of participant roles.” (2007, 339) In other words, an event schema is the conceptual core of a situation, which includes participant roles. Non-participant roles are “not a part of a situation’s conceptual core,” (2007, 268) but rather optional setting elements of a situation. Both participant and non-participant roles are “conceptual entities associated with a unique function in a situation,” (2007, 298) and they all have their counterparts in grammar. In a situation, participants can function as agents, themes or experiencers. Agents are participants that deliberately instigate an action, themes are the participants affected by an action or are neutrally involved in a situation, and experiencers are the participants that undergo an emotional, perceptual or mental experience. (2007, 269) The role of agents and experiencers in the grammatical structure of a sentence is that of the subject, while the theme functions as the object. According to Radden and Dirven (2007), all event schemas belong to one of three “worlds of experience”: the force-dynamic world, which includes the action, self-motion, caused-motion and transfer schema; the material world, which includes the occurrence, possession and location schema; and the psychological world, which includes the emotion, perception and cognition schema.

### *Event schema: Participant roles*

In order to conduct a thorough analysis, we need to give detailed definitions of the subject, object and adjunct. Greenbaum and Quirk define the role of the subject in a sentence and its word class in the following way: the subject is “an agentive participant (the doer of the

action)” or “the animate participant that instigates or causes the happening denoted by the verb” in clauses containing a direct object. (Greenbaum and Quirk 1990, 209) It is also “the noun phrase of a sentence that denotes the primary participant, or figure, in a situation, from whose perspective the situation is viewed.” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 47) Greenbaum and Quirk propose several roles a subject can have in a sentence, out of which the agentive role will be considered the typical semantic role of a subject. The agentive role of the subject is indicative of the agent in an action schema. Other semantic roles a subject can have are as follows: external causer, instrument, affected role which includes identifying and characterizing roles, recipient, experiencer, positioner, locative, temporal and eventive role, as well as prop *it* subject. (Greenbaum and Quirk 1990, 209-214) We will define them all because the subject roles will facilitate the process of determining types of event schemas.

The subject as external causer “expresses the unwitting (generally inanimate) cause of an event,” and the subject as instrument expresses “the entity (generally inanimate) which an agent uses to perform an action or instigate a process.” (Greenbaum and Quirk 1990, 210) Subject as external causer is indicative of the participant role of agent-like cause in the action schema. The affected role of a subject is normally a typical role of a direct object and it frequently appears with intransitive verbs. The affected participant can be animate and inanimate and it “does not cause the happening denoted by the verb, but it is directly involved in some other way.” (Greenbaum and Quirk 1990, 209) The affected participant is typically a theme in an event schema. If the affected participant appears in combination with copular verbs, the subject can either be identified or characterized, which means that the subject complement either identifies or characterizes the subject. This role usually has the grammatical form of the subject and object complements and it refers to the states in the occurrence schema. On the other hand, perceptual, cognition and emotion verbs usually indicate the experiencer role of a subject. Radden and Dirven define the experiencer role of a subject as “the participant that undergoes an emotional, perceptual or mental experience.” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 269) Verbs such as *possess*, *own* and *have* often indicate the recipient role of a subject. These verbs are normally static and indicate the psychological world. The recipient role is typical for the indirect object and it indicates “an animate being that is passively involved by the happening or state,” (Greenbaum and Quirk 1990, 209) which is indicative of a theme in certain schemas of the force-dynamic world.

Another important term that needs to be defined is the object. The object of a sentence is “the noun phrase of a sentence that denotes the secondary participant, or ground, in a

situation.” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 47) Semantically, the typical role of a direct object is that of the affected participant, which “does not cause the happening denoted by the verb, but is directly involved in some other way,” (Greenbaum and Quirk 1990, 209) and the typical role of an indirect object is that of the recipient, which indicates “an animate being that is passively involved by the happening or state.” (Greenbaum and Quirk 1990, 209) Furthermore, the semantic roles of an object fit the notion of theme. In the sense of Radden and Dirven, theme “is the neutral role played by a participant that is more passively involved in a situation, as an affected entity, as an entity brought into existence, as an entity that merely exists or as an entity that undergoes a change.” (2007, 270)

### *Non-participant roles*

Non-participant roles mainly have the function of “specify[ing] the setting of a situation: the place where an event occurs, the time when it occurs, and the circumstances under which it occurs,” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 268) i.e. the notions of space, time, circumstance, cause, reason, purpose, etc. (Radden and Dirven 2007, 303) They tend to be coded as adjuncts which specify the setting of a situation and are usually “prepositional phrases whose preposition primarily denote spatial relations.” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 303) Greenbaum and Quirk define prepositions as “a closed class of items connecting two units in a sentence and specifying a relationship between them,” (1990, 198) which accounts for the relational aspect of setting elements in the sense of Radden and Dirven (2007). Greenbaum and Quirk write about the spatial aspect of prepositions as well; “most of [preposition meanings] are either spatial or figuratively derived from notions of physical space.” (1990, 191) In addition to spatial meaning, prepositions, as well as adjuncts, can have the following meanings: temporal; cause and purpose; means, agency, instrument and stimulus; accompaniment; concession and other relations. (Greenbaum and Quirk 1990, 191-203)

## 6. Procedure and methodology

### 6.1. Procedure

#### *Units of analysis*

Studies about emotion concepts and metaphors more often than not include both linguistic expressions containing emotion nouns, such as *anger*, and other linguistic expressions of *anger*, such as *make somebody's blood boil*. Ogarkova and Soriano (2014) emphasize that in studies like this one it is sometimes impossible to determine to which emotion and domain these kinds of expressions belong exactly. (Ogarkova and Soriano 2014, 94) The problem lies in the comprehension of emotions as complex and basic, which is extensively discussed in disciplines ranging from psychology and anthropology to linguistics. (see Wierzbicka 2009) Ogarkova and Soriano report that the cross-cultural differences emerge on a “subordinate level” of emotions, i.e. when considering “emotion subtypes”, like glee, cheerfulness and elation, which are subtypes of happiness. (Ogarkova and Soriano 2014, 94) In order to be sure which emotions are the subject of this study, it will investigate only collocations that include the nouns *anger* and *žlost*. When discussing metaphorical expressions, the analysis of “exclusively multi-word expressions containing a specific emotion lexeme from a given target domain” (Ogarkova and Soriano 2014, 94) makes it possible to be specific about the target domain in question. It resolves the problem of combining grammatical with semantical analysis, as well. By investigating the relationship of the nouns *anger* and *žlost* with prepositions and verbs we can arrive at conclusions about the concepts of *anger* and *žlost* on both non-metaphorical and metaphorical levels.

As mentioned above, affective science extensively discusses the complexity of emotions. It has been noted that anger encompasses a variety of constituents which can be compared to the previously mentioned emotion subtypes, such as rage, wrath or fury. Thus, linguistic expression follows the natural course of emotion. In other words, out of four words denoting the given emotion, *anger* is “the least specialized, most salient, most neutral, appearing in all [grammatical] patterns, and able to express all aspects of the [anger] scenario.” (Stanojević, Tralić and Ljubičić 2012, 146) Moreover, “*fury*, *rage* and *wrath* are all limited by certain conceptual, frequency-related and ecological factors (...).” (Stanojević, Tralić and Ljubičić 2012, 146) In order to determine this, Stanojević, Tralić and Ljubičić (2012) look at

corpus frequency data, which show that *anger* is the most frequent of the four words in the Corpus of Contemporary American English, and they look at dictionary data, as well, where “*anger* is defined by its characteristics and a description of some parts of the scenario,” while “the remaining three words are defined with relation to it.” (138) The same is in Russian. If we take a look at dictionary data, *Gramota.ru* and *Tolkoviy slovar Ozhegova* define *zlost* as a negative unfriendly feeling, while *gnev*, *yarost* and *beshenstvo* are defined with relation to it, i.e. as more intense feelings of *zlost*. However, in Russian linguistics and psychology *gnev* is treated as the basic emotion for anger. Nevertheless, this study concentrates on *zlost* because the objective is to find differences in the conceptualization of the emotion. As the conceptual space of *zlost* is the most frequent out of the four words with about 1,500 instances in the form of noun, 540 in the form of verb and 5,500 in the form of an adjective in the Russian National Corpus, in this study this word is considered the most representative out of four words for this basic emotion. Hence, it is obvious at the beginning that Russian and American English speakers perceive anger differently. I consider *anger* and *zlost* to be pragmatic equivalents and this is the point of view I take in this study. I also want to highlight that in order to fully understand this complex emotion it is necessary to take into account all of the emotion nouns, but this exceeds the extent of this work and it needs to be further studied.

Another question that arises is that of word class, i.e. why choose nouns instead of adjectives or verbs. Firstly, “nouns seem to be an obvious choice to refer to a feeling” (Stanojević, Tralić and Ljubičić 2012, 134), and secondly, nouns appear in all grammatical patterns this study investigates. This is so because in cognitive grammar nouns compare to things, and grammatical patterns to relations. It allows for more domain specificity, which in turn makes data more comparable.

### *Corpus research*

Firstly we sought and read previous linguistic research on emotion, conceptual metaphor and the concept of anger on which we based our hypotheses. Then we conducted a semantic-grammatical analysis of corpora examples based on the Stanojević's levels of semantic-grammatical analysis (2013) and Radden and Dirven's cognitive grammar (2007). Sentences were grouped into three categories: sentences containing noun phrase *anger* with premodifiers, sentences containing noun phrase *anger* as a part of a superordinate noun phrase and sentences containing noun phrase with head noun *anger* in correlation with a verb. (Stanojević 2013) In order to avoid surpassing the usual extent of this kind of research, only

the latter group of sentences was further analyzed. In order to conduct a detailed analysis, we used Radden and Dirven's cognitive grammar (2007). We divided sentences containing noun phrase with head noun *anger* in correlation with a verb into two subgroups: sentences containing *anger* as a participant of event schemas and sentences containing *anger* as a non-participant in event schemas. As our starting point are grammatical constructions, this kind of analysis enables us to study both non-metaphorical and metaphorical expressions. We conducted grammatical analysis for both types of expressions. In order to conduct a semantical analysis, we used different methods. In order to determine non-metaphorical expressions semantically, we relied on our knowledge of the world (Žic-Fuchs 1991) and two online dictionaries: the Free Dictionary for English and Gramota.ru for Russian. In order to determine metaphorical expressions semantically, we relied on metaphorical extensions. In all stages of analysis we relied on the previous research and theoretical framework. To be able to compare the variations in the cultural models of *anger* in both languages, we firstly defined the prototypical model. We defined the prototypical metaphorical model according to Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and we defined the prototypical anger scenario by Kövecses (2002), as well. Then we conducted detailed semantic-grammatical analysis of corpora examples based on Radden and Dirven's cognitive grammar (2007). In the semantic part of analysis, we used metaphorical model by Lakoff and Johnson (1980). The metaphorical model was also the basis for our hypotheses, since numerous studies on the conceptual metaphor about *anger* have been conducted. Based on the previous research, we were able to propose the same grammatical results. Kövecses' anger scenario served us as the point of comparison. All of the event schemas and abstract space schemas easily fit into the anger scenario. We also compared the aspect of control in conceptualization of anger, which we determined through the analysis.

### *Questionnaire*

The questionnaire consists of one open question: *What is in your opinion true anger?* and its Russian counterpart *Chto po vashemu mneniyu yavlyatsya nastoyashchey zlostyu?*. The questionnaire was modeled according to Bartmiński's (2009) research of linguistic conception of stereotypes in which he studied the changes in the Polish stereotype of "a German". Bartmiński emphasizes the importance of the word *true* in eliciting a "real" picture from the respondents. Therefore, he tested the hypothesis that there will be difference if he asks respondents to define a typical, an ideal, a true German and a German without any modification. Typical German was defined with its positive and negative sides, while the



definition ideal German elicited only the positive picture of a German. When asked to define a true German, respondents described a picture similar to a typical German, but much more elaborated. One important difference is that a salient characteristic of the word *true* is its “enrichment and subjective relativisation of the quantifiers ‘all’ or ‘every’, which changes ‘All Scots are stingy’ to ‘All true Scots are stingy’.” (Bartmiński 2009, 186) In both typical and true pictures of a German, the everyday aspect is predominant, but the concept of a true German is richer in many aspects, including the cultural aspect. (Bartmiński 2009, 187) Therefore, the word *true* allows a more detailed picture of a concept than the word *typical* does. When asked to define a German without any modifiers, respondents described a picture which is a combination of a true and a typical German, while there were just a few characteristics of an ideal German. (Bartmiński 2009, 188-189) Based on these claims and my pre-research, I assume that the question about a German without modifiers is not clear enough. On the subconscious level we know there is a difference between a typical, a true and an ideal German, and we are not sure what to answer. “A German” comprises of all of the above, while true German relates to what we think is the most “real” picture of a German in the present society.

Therefore, we used the modifier *true* and its Russian counterpart *nastoyashchiy*. Another reason for this choice over the modifiers *typical* and *tipichniy* is that the Free Dictionary and Gramota.ru definitions of the word *typical* include situations that happen usually, while the adjectives *true* and *nastoyashchiy* mean “sincerely felt or expressed; unfeigned” and “sincere, unfeigned” respectively. We are not interested in what a typical situation may look like from the outside; we are interested in the deeply felt, true emotion of *anger* from a subjective point of view.

We asked an open question in order to get all kinds of answers from the respondents. Among non-metaphorical expressions, we have received metaphorical and metonymic expressions. However, the semantic-grammatical analysis in the sense of Radden and Dirven (2007) was not conducted since we have received a lot of occurrence schema and examples which need to undergo the first level of semantic-grammatical analysis. This goes beyond the framework of this study, but it can be an idea for further research, which would complement the study at hand. In order to make the results comparable with the results of the corpora analysis, we will incorporate the responses into the anger scenario and compare some aspects of *anger* which will stand out as prominent in both languages. As we do not know what aspects the respondents will write about, we will test the hypotheses for the corpora analysis

for those aspects for which we get answers. The examples will be elicited by using all of the above-mentioned methodology: by non-metaphorical meanings of expressions, metaphorical extensions, semantic-grammatical analysis where applicable and the knowledge of the world.

## 6.2. Methodology

### *Corpus research*

A hundred sentences each were randomly picked from the Corpus of Contemporary American English and from the Russian National Corpus (*Национальный корпус русского языка*) respectively. These corpora were selected because they are freely available online, searchable, and contain contemporary language. The Corpus of Contemporary American English was chosen because the study investigates American English. American English was chosen for practical reasons; I could collect more questionnaire responses from speakers of the American variant of English than of any other variant. The examples were filtered by the word *anger* for the English language and by the word *злость* for the Russian language. The Russian National Corpus suggests different filters for grammatical-lexical search. We set the “grammatical properties” filter for all categories in the section “case”. The examples were retrieved from both corpora on November 21<sup>th</sup> 2017. The Russian National Corpus consisted of roughly 283.5 million words at the moment of retrieval, with entries dating no further than 1970, while COCA counted approximately 560 million words, with entries dating not further than 1990. The Russian National Corpus is divided into several subcorpora and a main corpus containing contemporary written texts. We searched through the main corpus as it has the most content and incorporates various genres. The Corpus of Contemporary American English consists of five genres: spoken, fiction, popular magazines, newspapers, and academic journals. The corpora are comparable considering the types and timeframe of texts and the number of words. However, because of the number of questionnaire responses and corpora examples, the results of this study should be considered preliminary indicators for future studies. We conducted a semantic-grammatical analysis of corpora examples based on the Stanojević's levels of semantic-grammatical analysis (2013) and Radden and Dirven's cognitive grammar (2007).

## Questionnaire

In order to collect responses from native speakers of Russian and English, we sent out a questionnaire and asked them one open question: *What is in your opinion true anger?* and its Russian counterpart *Что по вашему мнению является настоящей злостью?*. Native speakers of English were speakers of American English so that we could stay within one variant of English, since we analyzed the Corpus of Contemporary American English and we deal with the culture and society. The number of participants is not extensive, but many participant answers are lengthy, so the number of units we can analyze is higher than the number of respondents. Russian respondents are 16 native speakers aged 18-54, and American participants are 16 native speakers aged from 16 to 55 or older. The majority of participants are women, but this will not concern us as Ogarkova and Soriano (2014) found no differences in male and female conceptualization of anger. Half of the Russian participants are aged 18-29 and half 30-54, while 80% of American participants are aged 18-29. The responses were analyzed by using Kövecses' anger scenario.

## 7. Hypotheses

Based on previous research and on our knowledge about situations in the sense of Radden and Dirven (2007), we can make several hypotheses:

1. The concomitant emotion schema in abstract space is more frequently used in Russian than it is in English.

According to Ogarkova and Soriano's study (2014), metaphors emphasizing somatic and physiological components of anger are more salient in Russian than they are in English. The concomitant emotion schema indicates the physiological effects of anger which are present simultaneously with anger, so this is our basis for this hypothesis. In addition, Kövecses (2000a) states that in the conceptualization of *anger*, metaphors appear more frequently in English, while metonymies dominate in Chinese and Zulu. Coincidentally, he states that embodiment has a greater role in Zulu and Chinese, while we also know that embodiment lies at the base of metonymies. Furthermore, Ogarkova and Soriano (2014) report that several studies concluded that Russian patients with depression describe their symptoms somatically to a greater extent than American patients do. One more hypothesis emerges from the claim that the Russian concept of anger is more embodied than the English one (Wierzbicka 1992):

2. Stage 2 of Kövecses' anger scenario in Russian is richer in content than in English.
3. In abstract space, the schema of emotions triggering reactions (without concomitant emotion) is richer in Russian than it is in English.

This hypothesis stems from Pavlenko's (2002) conclusion that Russian speakers talk about emotions as active processes expressed in a number of external behaviors, while American speakers refer to emotions as states, not necessarily externalized, as the schema "emotions triggering reactions" deals with different types of external reactions to the emotion of *anger*. Because of this we can suppose the following:

4. In the occurrence schema, the states and location schema will be more salient in English than in Russian.

Another hypothesis states that:

5. The schemas that show control over anger are more salient in Russian than they are in English.

This hypothesis is based on the finding that in Russian, controlled anger metaphors are more salient than in English. (Kövecses 2002) It also has to do with the above-mentioned individuality/collectivity concept. As Russian culture is more collectivistic, Russian speakers should conceptualize anger as more disruptive to the society and try to control it. (Ogarkova and Soriano 2014)

6. The stages of anger that show the loss of control are more prominent in Russian than they are in English.

This hypothesis stems from the finding that Russian metaphors emphasize the negativity of anger more than English metaphors do (Ogarkova and Soriano 2014). This is stated under the presumption that negativity means a lack of and inability to control anger.

## 8. Results and discussion

This section is divided into two subsections: event schemas (8.1.) and abstract space (8.2.). The first subsection consists of a detailed analysis of the event schemas in English and Russian and the second subsection consist of a thorough analysis of non-participant roles, i.e. of adjuncts featuring the noun *anger* coded as prepositional phrases.

### 8.1. Event schemas

#### 8.1.1. The force-dynamic world

Radden and Dirven claim that situations in the force-dynamic world describe “events which are brought about by human agents or other causal entities and have effects.” (2007, 284) Since this paper deals with the notion of *anger*, it explores only the events which include *anger*, regardless of whether the event was brought about by *anger*, or whether the agent of the event had effect on *anger*. The force-dynamic world includes the action schema, the self-motion schema, the caused-motion schema and the transfer schema.

##### *The action schema*

The action schema reflects the cognitive disposition of our own and other people’s deliberate actions: “it describes events in which a human agent deliberately and responsibly acts upon another entity, the theme.” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 284) As this section explores the role of *anger*, we found that *anger* can act upon another entity and be acted upon instead of the human agent. In other words, in the action schema *anger* is personified when it has the role of an agent and reified when it is a theme. Personification is an ontological metaphor which allows physical objects to be specified as being a person. In other words, personification “allows us to comprehend a wide variety of experiences with nonhuman entities in terms of human motivations, characteristics, and activities.” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 33) Therefore, we can conclude that action schemas are organized with the help of personification. This is expected, considering that the action schema usually involves human beings. Thus, if an action schema does not involve physical objects, but involves other entities, we will understand the meaning of the schema due to personification. Moreover, “each personification differs in terms of the aspects of people that are picked out,” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 33) so, in respect to this claim, *anger* can be characterized in different ways. For the purposes of this research paper, the role of *anger* was subdivided into three categories:

*anger* as an agent-like cause, *anger* as an agent, in which *anger* is personified, and *anger* as a theme (provoking anger, controlling anger, attempting to control anger), in which *anger* can be either personified or reified.

When anger is an agent, its function within a sentence is that of a subject with agentive role, like in the following sentence:

1) **Anger kept her watching.**

This type of subject causes the happening and deliberately acts upon another entity, in this example upon “her”. If anger is an agent in an action schema, and agents in the action schema act deliberately upon another entity, then anger has the control over the situation, i.e. it controls us, and not vice versa. This schema belongs to the 4<sup>th</sup> stage (loss of control) of the anger scenario.

*Anger* can have the role of an agentive subject in Russian as well, as in:

2) **Злость меня почему-то разобрала**, а Маша смотрит на меня синими глазами, и лицо у неё круглое и румяное.

(For some reason **anger has taken over me**. In the meantime, Masha is looking at me with her blue eyes and round, pink cheeks.)

*Anger* can also function as an agent-like cause, like in the following example:

3) **Anger inflamed Sang's eyes.**

In sentences like 3), *anger* is the subject with the role of an external causer which, as mentioned above, “expresses the unwitting (generally inanimate) cause of an event.” (Greenbaum and Quirk 1990, 210) Radden and Dirven (2007, 289) define agent-like causes as passive forms easily transformed into by-phrases as in the following sentence: *Sang's eyes were inflamed by anger*. Both agent-like causes and external causes are not deliberate actions, so there is no control over them. This grammatical structure is often used to talk about natural forces and disasters like in *Katrina devastated New Orleans*, (Radden and Dirven 2007, 189) so we can conclude that this is a case of the ANGER IS A NATURAL FORCE metaphor. As the experiencer in the sentence (Sang) experiences a physiological effect of anger (inflamed eyes), this sentence belongs to the second stage of Kövecses' anger scenario.

Other examples of *anger* as an agent-like cause belong to the fifth stage of the anger scenario, since they depict the acts of retribution and the reducing of the intensity of anger as in the following examples:

- 4) And **anger leads to** irrational behavior and that leads to hatred and that leads to violence.
- 5) Her **anger had dissipated** some of the **anxiety**.

As the number of examples for this schema is not abundant, we can think of these results as the preliminary indicators of this schema, which usually describe the situations from the 5<sup>th</sup> stage of the anger scenario.

In Russian there is only one sentence belonging to the category of the agent-like cause:

- 6) Бессильная **злость и ожидание** выстрела **измотали его** вконец.  
(The nerve-racking **anger** combined with the anticipation of the shot finally **drained him**.)

It can be turned into a by-phrase in the following way: *Он вконец был измотан бессильной злостью и ожиданием выстрела*. This translates to English as *He was finally drained by the nerve-racking anger combined with the anticipation of the shot*. This sentence belongs to the 5<sup>th</sup> stage of the anger scenario.

In the remaining four categories anger has the semantic role of a theme. In all of the categories, *anger* has the role of a direct object. The difference between the categories is in the way the theme is affected by the action. There are categories in which the agent suppresses anger, in which the agent tries to control the anger, in which s/he expresses the anger and in which s/he provokes the anger. Interestingly, there were no instances of the situations in which the agent had absolutely no control over anger. The situations in which the agent loses control over anger all include the attempt to control it. The first three categories include the direct object with the role of the affected participant and the last category includes the resultant direct object, i.e. “an object whose referent exists only by virtue of the activity indicated by the verb,” (Greenbaum and Quirk 1990, 212) like in the following example:

- 7) Military and Reservation authorities of the time believed that the Ghost Dance was a war dance, and they were equally wrong in thinking that **the Ghost Dance instigated anger**.

In sentences like 7), it is not clear whether *anger* can be controlled or not. *Anger* is a product, or rather a result, of an event and therefore belongs to the 1<sup>st</sup> stage in the anger scenario. The same applies to Russian in the following example:

- 8) Любой шедевр создаётся для «узкого круга тонких ценителей», какую **бы** зависть и **злость это не вызвало** у массового потребителя.

(Each masterpiece is made for “a narrow circle of connoisseurs”, regardless of the envy and **anger this might provoke** in mass consumers.)

The following three categories include a human agent as a subject and *anger* as the direct object. In the first category the human subject has control over anger:

- 9) At school he struggled socially but managed to **conceal his anger** and timidity behind a mask of stoic resolve.

- 10) Поэтому ты **тонишь** свою **злость** в алкоголе?

(Is that the reason you **drown** your **anger** in alcohol?)

The conclusion that this is an instance of control over *anger* is based on the non-metaphorical meaning of the predicate and on the fact that *anger* has the role of the direct object, which means that it is directly involved in the action in which an agent acts upon it deliberately. This category does not fit into the anger scenario; it is an instance of non-prototypical anger, most similar to “successful suppression”, in which “you successfully suppress your anger, S [self] keeps control and the intensity of anger goes away.” (Lakoff 1987, 402) I would propose calling this example “successful attempt at control.” The same is true of Russian.

There are also examples in which the agent succeeds in controlling *anger*, although it may be explicit that this lasted for only a short period of time, like in the following example:

- 11) **Having reined in** her **anger** over the last few minutes, Laurie now **gave in** to it.

There is another group of sentences in which it is obvious that the agent tries to control or struggles with controlling the anger, but is not certain whether the control is established or not, like in the following examples:

- 12) Sara struggled to **control** her **anger**.

- 13) Так противно на душе, второй день пытаюсь **унять** **злость** от такого матча!

(I feel awful, it's been two days since I've started trying to **tame** my **anger** because of that match!)



These sentences belong to the 3<sup>rd</sup> stage of the anger scenario (attempt at control).

The last group of sentences deals with expressing anger. These are non-prototypical situations, which belong to the category of “controlled response,” in which the experiencer gets angry, but retains control, and can direct their anger at the wrongdoer. (Lakoff 1987, 402) The examples are as follows:

- 14) Your press briefings have been town halls, people **venting** their **anger**, wondering where you were early on.

Controlled response can be explained in terms of the ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER metaphor, more precisely ANGER IS STEAM. The Free Dictionary provides two meanings of the transitive verb *to vent*: “to express (one's thoughts or feelings, for example), especially forcefully (see synonyms at voice)” and “to release or discharge (steam, for example) through an opening.” We usually release steam from a room or a container. Therefore, people are containers for anger, i.e. steam. In order to vent something, we need to take a controlled action – open the vent. On the other hand, the examples in Russian have the same grammatical structure, but do not quite fit the notion of controlled expression of anger, like in the following example:

- 15) Жена от него ушла, с работы выгнали, **злость вымещает** на матери.

(His wife left him, they fired him, and now he **takes it (anger) out** on his mother.)

The Gramota.ru on-line dictionary gives only one definition of the verb *vymestit*: to satisfy one's anger, annoyance, etc. by getting even with somebody. However, if we take a closer look, the verb consists of the prefix *vy-*, which indicates the external space like in the verbs *vygnat* (throw out) and *vyti* (go out), the base *mesto* (location) and infinitive ending *-tit*. There is also a nuance of force to the meaning, so we get *force out of a place*, or rather *release out of a place*. Therefore, I would argue that this is not an instance of the controlled expression of anger, but rather release of anger in the sense of King. (as quoted in Kövecses 2000a, 161) This fits one of prototypical cognitive models of anger in Chinese and is 4<sup>th</sup> stage in the anger scenario. In this stage, “the self releases anger by exhibiting angry behavior” (Kövecses 2000 Universal, 161) like in the example 15). In addition, we have already argued that the Chinese and Russian cultures share some similarities: the collectivity aspect (Ogarkova and Soriano 2014) and the somatic expression of emotions. (Ogarkova and Soriano 2014) Therefore, it is not surprising that they share this semantic-grammatical structure for talking about anger.

### *The self-motion schema and the caused-motion schema*

Next in order is the self-motion schema, which describes “an agent’s instigated own motion,” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 291) expressed either by the intransitive or the intransitive predicate-complement construction. On the other hand, the caused-motion schema, which describes “the events in which an energetic force, typically a human agent, brings about the motion of a thing to or from a location,” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 292) is expressed by the transitive predicate-complement pattern, also called the caused-motion construction. The caused-motion construction comprises “a subject denoting a cause, a predicate denoting motion, a direct object denoting the moving theme, and a complement denoting the goal or source; more abstractly: X causes Y to move to/from Z.” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 292) In this study, *anger* can be the subject, in which case *anger* is personified, or the theme, in which case it can be either personified or reified, like in the action schema.

Radden and Dirven give the following definition of reification:

Reification involves a metaphorical shift from a relational entity into a thing. It makes us see a relation as having some kind of “ontological existence (from Greek *óntos* 'being'). This type of metaphorical shift has therefore been named ontological metaphor. Since relations are essential to conceptual cores and situations, ontological metaphors allow us to understand events and states in terms of things.

(Radden and Dirven 2007, 78)

When reified, anger is metaphorically shifted from the meaning of *a strong feeling of displeasure or hostility* to the meaning of embodiment of a thing, or, more specifically, a substance. In addition, Radden and Dirven provide four types of reification according to the type of abstract noun at hand. Abstract nouns can denote episodic or steady situations implying situations which, “due to their limited duration, are seen as discrete episodes” or situations which “are seen as lasting indefinitely or holding in general” respectively. (2007, 81) Episodic and steady situations branch out into episodic states and events, and steady events and states. As “steady states that are reified as substances include fairly permanent attributes such as being (...) happy (*happiness*)” (2007, 82), we argue that *anger* accounts for the ontological metaphor STEADY STATES ARE SUBSTANCES. For this reason, we will treat *anger* as a substance.

In the caused-motion schema examples in English, the complement to the verb is a direct object followed by a prepositional phrase in the role of predication adjunct, which denotes the notion of direction, like in:

16) He could **put anger** in his words, but not his tone.

Anger is the direct object, and *in his words* and *his tone* are the predication adjuncts. In this kind of schema anger is reified as a substance that can be moved from place to place, i.e. that can easily be controlled. Likewise, there are several examples of the caused-motion schema in Russian, like:

17) В общем, уехал он, а всю свою неистраченную **злость начальство обратило** на меня.

(Anyway, he left, so the commanders **directed** all of their unspent (accumulated) **anger** toward me.)

In this example *anger* is again the direct object moved from the location of commanders to the location of *me*, making it a reified substance that can be easily controlled. Furthermore, the predication adjunct in the caused-motion schema indicates a place to which *anger* is directed. For this reason, the caused-motion schema belongs to the 5<sup>th</sup> stage of the anger scenario, in which “the wrongdoer is the target of the act.” (Lakoff 1987, 398)

As for the self-motion schema, it was found only in Russian. It describes “an agent’s instigated own motion,” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 291) expressed either by the intransitive or the intransitive predicate-complement construction in English, with the addition of the transitive predicate complement construction in Russian. There were examples for both cases in Russian:

18) Накопившиеся с утра раздражение и **злость выплеснулись** мощной волной на несчастного Ромчика Дзюбу, когда Антон узнал, что адвокатом по делу об убийстве тренера Болтенкова пригласили Киргана.

(The irritation and **anger** that accumulated over the morning **poured over** in a loud splash on the unfortunate Romchik Dzyuba when Anton found out that Kirgan was invited take part in the Boltenkov case as attorney.)

This sentence is a transitive predicate-complement construction because of the reflexive verb „vyplesnutsya” or literally splash oneself out. The self-motion schema invokes the source-

path-goal schema, but it highlights the path and the goal, instead of the source. In sentence 18) the goal is Romchik and the path is described not only by the verb, but also by the manner complement „in a loud splash“. The lack of control can be explained in terms of the ANGER IS A HOT LIQUID IN A CONTAINER metaphor. When there is too much anger, or liquid in a container, it goes over the limit, i.e. pours over, and control is lost. The self-motion schema therefore belongs to the 4<sup>th</sup> stage of the anger scenario (loss of control).

19) Я тебя, зайчонок, видимо вовсе уж разозлил... Но **злость пройдет**, а любовь останется — во всяком случае, моя к тебе.

(It seems, honey, that I've made you quite angry... But **anger will pass**, and love will stay – my love for you, at the least.)

This is an example of an intransitive construction without a goal, there is only path expressed by the verb “pass”. In both constructions of the self-motion schema there is no control over *anger* because *anger* is a personified agent which instigates its own motion. As in this schema *anger* instigates its own motion, we will consider this schema to belong to the 4<sup>th</sup> stage of the anger scenario – the loss of control.

### *The transfer schema*

The last schema in the force dynamic world is the transfer schema, which describes “events in which an agent passes a thing to a recipient.” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 294) A change of possession normally occurs during this kind of events. Moreover, we are interested in exploring the abstract transfer – the transmission of abstract things such as knowledge, concepts, ideas and emotions. Abstract transfer can be expressed through the ditransitive and the caused-motion structure. In theory, *anger* can be any participant of the schema: the agent (a subject), the thing that is being passed (a direct object, affected by the action) or the recipient (typical role of an indirect object). The presence of control over *anger* or the lack of it will be determined in accordance with the role *anger* has within the schema. All of these functions can be observed in the following example in Russian:

20) И **злость** потом **перенес** на безвинного Малецкого, хотя надо бы подивиться в очередной раз вывороченности человеческой психики.

(He then **transferred the anger** to the innocent Maletsky, which calls for at least a regular act of surprise at the perversity of the human mind.)

In this sentence there is a man in the role of the agent, who passes *anger* (an abstract thing, a direct object) to Maletsky (a recipient, an indirect object). The transfer schema is considered to denote non-deliberate events (Radden and Dirven 2007, 297) in which the agent is “the cause of an emotion aroused in the experiencer.” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 297) Therefore, we will consider this schema a non-prototypical example in the anger scenario schema, which we will call *non-deliberate transfer*.

There is also an example in which *anger* is the agent passing strength as a reified thing to a recipient:

21) Я подумал, что они надо мной издеваются, и разозлился. **Злость придала мне сил**, и остаток пути я проделал уже гораздо увереннее, тем более что приближение к земле делало мой спуск все менее опасным.

(For a moment I thought they were making fun of me and I got angry. **Anger gave me strength** and the rest of the trip I steered with a lot more confidence, especially because approaching ground made my descent less dangerous.)

This schema indicates non-prototypical *anger*, more precisely a “constructive use” of anger: “instead of attempting an act of retribution, you put your anger to a constructive use,” i.e. “s[elf] remains in control.” (Lakoff 1987, 402) Therefore, in this instance there is control over anger.

### 8.1.2. The material world

As stated in Radden and Dirven, “situations that belong to the material world comprise the occurrence of things in states and processes [(the occurrence schema)], the location and motion of things [(the location schema)], and the possession of things [(the possession schema)].” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 272) The occurrence schema brings forth the difference between the conceptualization of anger as states and as processes. Processes indicate the nature of *anger*, i.e. its abruptness or graduality, and the possession schema reveals *anger* either as a possessor or a possessed entity. The location schema is very similar to states because it characterizes static relations and it is usually coded as a sentence containing the copular verb *to be*. The occurrence schema will help us test hypothesis number 4.

### *The occurrence schema*

The occurrence schema describes “the state or process an entity is in.” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 272) Radden and Dirven explain that the notion of *occurrence* is understood “in the sense of the way things are or happen in the material world.” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 272) The occurrence schema consists of states and processes and it is the largest schema in the material world in both languages. States “involve a relation between a theme and an entity specifying it” (Radden and Dirven 273) and branch out to property assignment like *But his anger is real, and it is palpable*, category inclusion like *Anger is part of his grief* and identification like *But her anger is also her fuel—“positive anger”, she calls it*. All of these relations are described as “A is B”, or, in other words, by the copulative construction. Although states give important information about anger, the information spectrum is too vast for this study. States provide us with significant information about anger that can be combined with the information drawn from the first level of the semantic-grammatical analysis in the sense of Stanojević (2013), but since this study deals with deciphering the meaning coded in relations, we will discuss only the information we have inferred about the relations of anger from states. States will be used to test the fourth hypothesis and they will be considered the first stage of the anger scenario. On the other hand, processes “may involve a change of state or be steady” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 274). Changes of state describe a transition from one state to another, while steady processes describe unchanging events.

Steady processes are processes “which involve non-humans or not intentionally acting humans as their theme.” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 275) These kinds of processes have the properties of inherently unchanging events which are “not compatible with expressions that denote a change”. (Radden and Dirven 2007, 275) Therefore, in order to test if a sentence is a steady process, we can add the expressions *more and more* in English and *vsyo bolshe i bolshe* into Russian to the sentences. If they do not function with the given expressions, the sentences denote steady processes. Steady processes will help us test the fourth hypothesis and determine whether the unchanging events involve the constant presence and evolving of *anger* or its reduction. In English all examples of steady processes involve the constant presence or the evolving of *anger*, like in the following example:

22) I’d say the first five, six years, I was **consumed by anger**.

If we added the expression *more and more* to the sentence, we would have to change it to *I was being consumed by anger more and more*, which sounds unnatural and is a changing

process, or to *anger was consuming me more and more*, which is an action schema. Hence, the sentence does not function with the expression *more and more* and is a steady process.

In Russian there are three examples, all of which involve the constant presence of *anger*, like in the following sentence:

23) В основном **злость**, приправленная завистью, **концентрируется** на олигархах с их яхтами, футбольными клубами и прочими излишествами.

(**Anger**, mixed with envy, usually **concentrates** on oligarchs and their yachts, soccer clubs, and other luxuries.)

Steady processes will be considered the second stage of the anger scenario.

Other processes involve a change of state which is marked by “the transition from a previous state to a new state.” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 274) These processes can either be gradual, like in the verb *grow*, or abrupt and unexpected like in the verb *fall*. The nature of the process at hand, as well as the reduction and the production of *anger*, will be the main criteria for the analysis. Sentences with reducing anger belong to the 5<sup>th</sup> stage, while sentences denoting the production of anger belong to the second stage of the anger scenario. An example of a gradual process which denotes the reduction of anger is the following:

24) The general’s **anger faded**.

In this sentence anger was at some point intense, and it started to fade. The Free Dictionary defines the verb *to fade* as “to disappear gradually,” which is how have determined the graduality or abruptness of the process. Fading is a gradual change of state. If it would not be gradual, its abrupt equivalent would be to vanish, for example. Sentences which include the production of anger or its increase of intensity are as follows:

25) As he talks, his **anger bubbles up**.

In Russian, gradual changes mostly describe anger increasing:

26) Медведев почувствовал, как **злость поднимается** в нем.

(Medvedev felt the **anger rising** in him.)

There is one sentence which describes anger fading 27), and one which describes anger becoming positive 28):

27) Поэтому его собственная **злость исчезала**, едва возникнув.

(That's why his own **anger was fading away**, barely having emerged in the first place.)

28) Члены вашего фан-клуба утверждают, что когда вы злитесь, вы раздеваетесь до трусов и ваша **злость становится спортивной**.

(The members of your fan-club confirmed that you undress to your underpants when you're angry and your **anger then turns into agitation**)

The sentence in g) is not a prototypical description of anger; it belongs to the “constructive use” of anger, in which “the self remains in control and performs a constructive act instead of a retributive act.” (Lakoff 1987, 402) We will count this example with other instances of controlled anger.

The abrupt changes of state in which anger reduces are exemplified in the next sentence:

29) The call sign looked familiar because it was, and my **anger vanished** as my face broke into a huge smile.

In order to determine the abruptness of the verb, we consulted the Free Dictionary, which defines the verb *to vanish* as “to pass out of sight, especially quickly”. There are also sentences which denote abrupt changes of state in which anger is produced, like in the following example:

30) **Anger flashed** across Reedy's face.

The Free Dictionary defines the verb *to flash* as “to appear or occur suddenly.”

Russian speakers describe anger as an abrupt fading process, as well:

31) **Злость** тут же **исчезает**.

(**Anger** immediately **disappears**.)

Other examples describe anger becoming visible:

32) Феодосия холодела, догадываясь о смысле этих намёков, но сейчас в ней **проснулась злость**.

(Feodosia was cooling down as she began to understand the meaning of the hints, but now **anger woke up** in her.)



In 31), the word *immediately* indicates the abruptness of process, while in 32) it is necessary to have the embodied knowledge of the world about the process of waking up.

### *The location schema*

The location schema describes two event schemas which are felt to be closely related because they are coded in the location schema the same way they are coded in the states in the occurrence schema – by the copular verb *to be*. (Radden and Dirven 2007, 276) For this reason, locations often “invite implicatures which are strikingly similar to the specifications described by states,” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 276) like in the following examples:

- a) My **anger is closer to the surface** this time; I can feel it hot and palpable under the collar of my shirt, in the pulse in my neck, and in the palms of my clenched fists.
- b) Buloff Vlad, **многовато злости в вашем посте**.  
(Buloff Vlad, **there's** quite a lot of **anger** in your post.)

For this reason, we will consider the location schema to be a static representation of the concept of *anger* and to belong to the first stage of the anger scenario.

### *The possession schema*

The possession schema describes “a relation between a possessor and a theme.” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 279) Radden and Dirven classify the possession schema as a material world schema, which supports the idea that abstract notions like emotions can be reified as a substance of possession. Moreover, “many languages code ‘possession’ as location.” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 279) The conceptualization of location as possession can be explained in the following manner: we expect that people have their possessions with them, or close to them, so some languages code possession in terms of a possessed object being close to their possessors. (Radden and Dirven 2007, 279) The analysis of the sentences reflecting the possession schema resulted in the conclusion that *anger* can be conceptualized either as a possessor or a possessed substance. This conclusion can be reached by sentence analysis – sentences expressing the possession schema are usually transitive and code the possessor as the subject, and the possessed substance as the direct object. (Radden and Dirven 2007, 279) The possessor is usually “a human and the thing possessed a physical object.” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 279) In the sense of our study, when coded as possessor, *anger* is personified, and when coded as the thing possessed, anger is a reified substance. In English

there is one example in which *anger* is the possessor 33), and four in which *anger* is the possessed, like in example 34):

33) **Anger has** a way of consuming its victims.

34) **John had** enough **anger** to go on all afternoon, but not the time.

When anger is a possessor, it is personified because we usually perceive humans as owning things, i.e. possession is a human social construct. For this reason, we will treat this type of sentences as the loss of control or 4<sup>th</sup> stage of the anger scenario. When a human being has possession over an abstract concept like in sentence m), the abstract concept is reified, in our case as a substance. As mentioned above, the possession schema has some similarities with the location schema. One of the similarities is coding possessions and locations with the use of the copular verbs *to be* and *to have*. (Radden and Dirven 2007, 279) Another similarity that the use of copular verbs produces is the conceptualization of possession as a state. For this reason, when *anger* is a theme in the possession schema, we will refer to it as a state and the first stage of the anger scenario. We will consider the notion of control as not indicated.

The same rules apply in Russian, like in the following examples:

35) Когда **нами овладевает злость** и гнев, мстительность, горечь; и наоборот, когда мы наполнены лаской, любовью, состраданием или когда срасть вдруг охватывает, как пожар, - это все молитва.

(When **anger and rage**, vindictiveness and bitterness **take over us** (lit. take possession over us), and vice versa, when we are filled with kindness, love and empathy or when we are suddenly submerged by passion, like a fire, all of that is prayer.)

36) У **них** далеко идущие планы и большая **злость** встать каждый день на ступеньку повыше!

(They **have** (lit. by them are) big plans and big **eagerness** to climb a step further each day!)

In example 35) *anger* is personified and, therefore, there is no control over it. In contrast with the sentence 33), in the sentence *when anger takes over us*, anger has possession over living beings. Gramota.ru defines the verb *ovladet* as “take by force, seize”. Non-metaphorically, the verb *ovladet* is usually used to indicate the act of taking possession over land. So when we say that anger took possession over us in Russian with the construction *zlost ovladela nami*, there

is a notion of control over a thing, over something reified. Hence, this whole sentence should be thought of metaphorically, *zlost* as a human being and *us* as objects. If the notion of *we* would not be a metaphorical construction, the sentence would mean that a person has possession over person, which is slavery, and the relationship of the concepts of *anger* and *us* in the verb *ovladet* is not as intense as the notion of slavery.

The example 36) is the example of coding possession as location by means of the construction *by them is anger*. Radden and Dirven (2007) state that “the situations in which objects are always or often close to a person invite the implicatures that they belong to that person” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 279) and give examples of Russian, Finnish and Japanese, literally translating *John has two children* as *At/to John are two children*. I would argue that for the Russian construction *u menya* a more adequate translation would be *by me*, as both *u* and *by* mean *close by* or *next to*. Both Gramota.ru and the Free Dictionary list this meaning as the first meaning of the two prepositions. Moreover, *at* and *to* are directional prepositions, while *by* and *u* indicate a location, which is the main argument for my translation.

### 8.1.3. The psychological world

Event schemas in the psychological world describe “experiences people have or are subjected to.” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 280) Event schemas within the psychological world belong either to the emotion or perception and the cognition schema, depending on the cognitive awareness of the experiencer. The emotion schema involves the roles of experiencer and a cause, while the perception and the cognition schema involve the roles of experiencer and a theme. The difference between the given schemas lies in the “experiencer’s control over her experience and the impact an external stimulus has on her psychological state.” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 282) The emotion schema suggests low experiencer’s control and high external stimulus, the perception schema medium experiencer’s control and low external stimulus, and the cognition schema suggests high experiencer’s control and low external stimulus. The reason for this is that we can control notions that are a part of the cognition schema through our cognitive abilities, like in *Daskeh forgot her anger*. We can be asked to think about this notion in an imperative form like in *Forget your anger!* or to think about it in the future like in *I will forget their anger*. Contrarily, this is not possible in the emotion schema, because we understand notions that bring about our emotions as “having an inherent

quality which stimulates emotion in us.” (2007, 281) We cannot ask someone to *feel a dull anger*, but we can imagine a cause for feeling the given emotion. The psychological world schemas enable us to analyze the degree of control an experiencer has over the emotion of anger.

In the perception schema, with medium control, there are no examples in English, and in the cognition schema, with high control, there are two examples:

37) “Women have been trained to **think of anger** as a horrible thing,” she says.

In Russian, however, there are no examples for the cognition schema, but there is one for the perception schema:

38) Были **видны** страсть и **спортивная злость**, с которой хоккеисты вступали в единоборства, ведя борьбу за каждую шайбу.

(The passion and **agitation** the hockey players took to the ice court while battling for every puck **was obvious**.)

The emotion schema, displaying little to no control over the emotion, has examples both in English and in Russian, where almost every example features the verb *feel* and its Russian equivalent (*po*)*chustvovat*:

39) I **felt** a dull **anger**: home, its madness, a familiar contempt.

40) Странно, но **никакой злости** я к ней **не почувствовал**.

(Strangely, I **felt no anger** towards her.)

All examples in the psychological world were analyzed according to their non-metaphorical meanings. The emotion and the perception schema belong to the second stage of the anger scenario because they describe psychological reactions to *anger*, while the cognition schema does not fit the prototypical anger scenario because it involves control over *anger*.

## 8.2. Abstract space

This section deals with the non-participant role of *anger*. To repeat, the non-participant role in an event schema is usually expressed as the adjunct of a sentence and appears in the form of a prepositional phrase consisting of the noun *anger* and a spatial preposition. This kind of a prepositional phrase normally describes abstract notions such as circumstance, cause, reason, purpose, etc. by means of spatial prepositions. The above-

mentioned abstract notions can be defined as an ‘abstract space’ - “domains other than ‘space’ and ‘time’ which are systematically conceptualized in terms of physical space.” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 326) In other words, when people talk about abstract notions, such as cause, by means of spatial prepositions, they place a cause in the ‘abstract space’. Consequently, they use the metaphorical extensions of space to express a cause. The reason for this is that “most prepositions denote spatial relations as their basic and historically primary meanings and their uses in abstract domains are metaphorical extensions of spatial meanings.” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 304) In this section of the paper, we will find and explain metaphors that link the primary meaning of spatial prepositions with their secondary, abstract meaning. The link between the two meanings is important because “seeing and describing time, circumstances, cause, reason or purpose in terms of space is so natural that we have to think twice before we realize that we are dealing with metaphor.” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 304) In other words, we will heavily rely on the metaphorical extensions of meaning in order to analyze the abstract space.

#### 8.2.1. Defining cause, reason and purpose

The main focus of this study is the categories of ‘cause’, ‘reason’ and ‘purpose’, i.e. the notions of causality. According to Radden and Dirven, the notions of causality “provide causal explanations for changes of state or events” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 327) blurring the lines between them blurred. Nevertheless, Radden and Dirven separate the three notions by defining them as follows:

Causes are situations which trigger off another physical or psychological situation as their effect. Causes can be paraphrased by *because of*, *as a result of*, and *due to*.

Reasons are situations which are adduced as an explanation or justification for the occurrence of a situation. The causal link between these situations only exists in the mind of the speaker and reflects her judgement, i.e. it does not need to be factual. Reasons can typically be paraphrased by *on account of*.

Purposes are situations which refer to a goal which is intended or hoped to be attained by means of one’s actions. Purposes are projected into posterior time, and like reasons, only exist in the mind of the speaker. Reasons can typically be paraphrased by *in order to*.

(Radden and Dirven 2007, 328)

In other words, ‘purpose’ and ‘reason’ differ from ‘cause’ on the level of the relation between one of the causal notions and a nuclear event: cause conveys meaning at the level of physical reality, while purpose and reason convey meaning at the cognitive level. (Radden and Dirven 2007, 327) Taking into account the results of the analysis, this paper focuses on the notion of ‘cause’ as it yielded the most numerous and relevant results.

Causes are divided into three categories: direct and indirect causes, causes triggering emotions and emotions triggering reactions. This study will deal mainly with emotions triggering reactions and causes triggering emotions as there were only two examples of direct and indirect causes in both languages. All categories are expressed by spatial prepositions and are inseparable from their effects. (Radden and Dirven 2007, 328) The inseparability of the categories and their effects makes it possible to explore the direct relation of causes and the effects of *anger* within a sentence.

#### 8.2.2. Causes triggering emotions

Naturally, this group describes causes that trigger a particular emotional reaction. This study deals exclusively with causes that trigger *anger*. They can be targeting, indeterminate and repetitive or long. Targeting causes are usually expressed by the targeting preposition *at*, indeterminate by the preposition *about* and repetitive or long by the orientational preposition *over*.

As no examples for this category have been found in our 100 examples from the Russian corpus, we will discuss only English examples.

All of the prepositions which indicate causes triggering reactions are orientational or dimensional. In other words, they are metaphorical orientations that convey causal meaning through the relations of space. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) call this phenomenon the orientational metaphor. It arises “from the fact that we have bodies of the sort and that they function as they do in our physical environment,” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 14) i.e. “they have a basis in our physical and cultural experience.” (1980, 14) Let us take an example that we will discuss in detail below. If we are angry *at* someone, the selection of the preposition is not arbitrary. We are angry *at* someone, because we perceive *anger* as a thing directed at a zero-dimensional goal. In zero-dimensional spaces the shape of the landmark is not important. We are *at the mall*, which means location, and we are throwing a ball *at* someone with the

goal to hit them, like with *anger*. There is also a cultural background to the orientational metaphors. Bartmiński (2009) emphasizes the social and the cultural aspect in the orientational metaphors by referring to Krzeszowski's theory on the ethnical notions of uprightness and "fallness" which originates from a child's learning to walk. Krzeszowski writes about the positive valuations of 'up' and 'front', and Bartmiński adds the dimensions of 'right' and 'left'. Left would be considered positive on the somatic level because it is the side of the heart. He argues that the "positiveness" of the sides is in fact culturally based because it would be expected that we perceive the left side more favorable because of the somatic reasons. Instead, he argues that in some cultures right may be more favorable because of some social and cultural constructs, like, for example, righthandedness, in which we teach children to do everything with their right hand, although they may be left-handed, or we find right more favorable because of the valuation of the political left and right in public discourse. (Bartmiński 2009, 49) If the perception of the world were based exclusively on our embodied experience, there would be no difference in using the prepositions with the same non-metaphorical spatial meanings in their metaphorical expressions. On the basis of these examples, we expect some differences between prepositions combined with the word *anger* in Russian and English.

In order to explain the above-mentioned prepositions, it is important to understand the notions of a trajector and landmark. A trajector is "the thing to be located" and a landmark is "the thing that serves as the reference point." (Radden and Dirven 2007, 305) Furthermore, it is important to note that *anger* can appear with a preposition, like, for instance, *anger at God*, or be the object of a preposition, like *shame at anger*. This research paper deals mainly with *anger* as the object of a preposition, while *anger* in combination with a preposition appears only in the category of causes triggering emotions.

### *Targeting*

The preposition *at* is a dimensional preposition which refers to a zero-dimensional space, i.e. a point without shape, which can be used both in the location schemas and in the motion schemas. This means that it can be locative and directional respectively. In its locative sense it can be used only with non-human landmarks, e.g. *at home*. In the directional sense, the preposition *at* directs an object towards a point without a shape, i.e. a target, which makes the action hostile and aggressive. In this case the preposition *at* can be used with human landmarks, like in:

41) Object grief, spiritual despair, **anger at God** and serious doubt are common responses to suffering and loss.

In this example, where *anger* appears with a preposition, people who suffer because of loss target their anger and other negative emotions at God, an entity that they find responsible for their anger. It is important to notice that the non-metaphorical meaning of this sentence justifies the claim that actions toward a target are hostile and aggressive. It would be strange to say that *happiness at God* is a common response of a grateful person. When *anger* is the object of the preposition *at*, *anger* is personified as in the following example:

42) My hand trembled now as I touched her eyes with the brush, and when I held the lipstick, I pressed it hard against her mouth and I cast aside the shame **at** my **anger** and I watched this mouth in my mind, the quick smile of it that never changed in all the years, that never sensed any mood in me but loyal, subordinate friendship.

Radden and Dirven claim that “we cannot make inanimate entities responsible for causing something unless we personify them.” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 329) which confirms in this example, anger causes shame.

As all of the above prepositions deal with the causes of anger, except for the example 42) which deals with anger as the cause for shame because of its grammar, the causes triggering reaction (anger) will be considered the first stage of the anger scenario.

#### *Repetitive or long reaction*

The preposition *over* is an orientational preposition which “is vertically superior to the landmark” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 315), but it conveys causal meaning via its temporal meaning. It refers to a period which is not fixed in time, “a period that is surveyed as a whole, as if seen from a bird’s eye view,” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 322) and it usually describes “larger time units like years, months, weeks and weekends.” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 322) It can be repetitive because the second meaning of the preposition is *again*; like in the phrases *do something over* or *over and over again*. The following sentence portrays the reactions to anger which are long:

43) As **anger over** mistreatment of America's veterans grows, we will ask the White House chief of staff why the president isn't taking more a direct role in fixing it.



In this example, the causal meaning is conveyed by the temporal meaning of the preposition *over*. It implies that the mistreatment of America's veterans has been going on for a longer period of time and at some point people got angry about it, which lasts until this moment. We can "see" this period from a bird's eye view because we are not immersed in it, but can see its beginning and duration up to this moment in time.

#### *Indeterminate reaction*

The preposition *about* is an orientational path preposition which describes indeterminate dispersed "motion in any direction relative to a landmark." (Radden and Dirven 2007, 321) In its temporal sense it includes a given point in time.

- 44) He sensed that others had long since dismissed him in that role. Out of **anger about** that, and perhaps sensing the truth of Beno's words, he emphasized his paternal authority by pushing away his plate and standing up.

All of the given prepositions describe a cause which provokes an emotional reaction. For this reason, causes triggering reactions belong to the first stage of the anger scenario. They also define *anger* as a reaction to some kind of provocation.

#### 8.2.2. Emotions triggering reactions

Emotions triggering reactions in English consist of four subcategories: reactions triggered by intense emotion, reactions concomitant with emotion, emotions that are motives for reactions and emotions that are reasonings of reactions. (Radden and Dirven 2007, 329) This study is not concerned with the reasoning of reactions as no examples were found for this category in either language. The remaining three categories are examined from the point of view of the subject's level of control over the emotion and are incorporated into the anger scenario. This can be done by virtue of using the literal meaning of the spatial prepositions in order to explain their metaphorical meaning.

#### *Intense emotion and the motive for emotion: the containment metaphor and the contact schema*

In order to understand the motivation of saying *she did it out of anger* and *she did it in anger* we must understand the principle of the variant of the main *anger* metaphor: ANGER IS A CONTAINER. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) explain that as we are physical beings, we are "set

off from the rest of the world by the surface of our skin, and we experience the rest of the world outside us.” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 29) Therefore, we have an in and out orientation and we experience other physical objects, among which is our body, as containers. The most salient metaphor for anger in English is the ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER metaphor, in which anger is conceptualized as a hot fluid inside of our bodies, which can go over the limit in quantity, heat or pressure. Nevertheless, we will take a look at one of its variants - ANGER IS A CONTAINER. If *anger* is a container, and if we have an in and out orientation when conceptualizing containers, then we can do something in anger and out of *anger*. If we do something in anger, it is an instance of an intense emotion. The container preposition *in* triggers “reactions which are beyond a person’s control” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 329), as illustrated in the following example:

45) “If you weren’t my boss, Abe, I’d ask you to step outside and fight!” I said, unwisely, **in anger**.

The lack of control can be explained by the above-mentioned containment metaphor in which a person feeling anger is actually contained by anger, or, literally, *in an anger container*, denying the access to anything outside it, including control. Therefore, a person who does something *in anger* has no control over the emotion and is, consequently, controlled by it.

People can also have motives for emotions. In other words, a certain action can be motivated by an emotion. Reactions which are a result of an emotion suggest “the person’s active and controlled part in determining her reaction.” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 330) These kinds of emotions are expressed by what Radden and Dirven call the emergence preposition *out of* (Radden and Dirven 330), as in the following sentence:

46) He sensed that others had long since dismissed him in that role. **Out of anger** about that, and perhaps sensing the truth of Beno's words, he emphasized his paternal authority by pushing away his plate and standing up.

In contrast with the container preposition *in*, the emergence preposition *out of* allows the experiencer to emerge, i.e. to come out of the metaphorical anger container, thereby proposing the experiencer’s access to control over *anger*. In other words, the prepositions *in* and *out of* depict the two sides of the containment image – if the experiencer acts *in anger*, s/he is contained and has no control over his or her actions, and if s/he, on the other hand, acts *out of anger*, s/he steps out of the metaphorical anger container and gains control over his or her

actions. Hence, the preposition *out of* implies the experiencer's conscious decision that stems out of the emotion of anger. Lakoff and Johnson call the examples with the preposition *in* the container metaphor, while the examples with the preposition *out of* are called the emergence metaphor, in which "the act or event is viewed as an object that emerges from the container." (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 75) Furthermore, the containment and emergence metaphors imply three-dimensionality, which explains the notion of the experiencer's control over anger. Radden and Dirven (2007) explain that the source preposition *out of* "makes us see the trajector's emergence from the depth of a container and hence suggests greater effort" (Radden and Dirven 2007, 313) than if the emergence would happen from a zero-dimensional space, which would be denoted by the preposition *from*.

Therefore, doing something *in anger* is considered to be an intense emotion which we cannot control and belongs to the fourth stage of the anger scenario. Doing something *out of anger*, on the other hand, takes a great effort and gives the experiencer enough time to make the decision of taking an action deliberately and consciously. This will therefore be considered a motive and will not fit into the anger scenario. It will be considered a controlled response (Lakoff 1987, 402).

The conceptualization of intense anger and the motive for anger is somewhat different in Russian, i.e. it does not include the containment metaphor. It includes the notion of contact. In order to compare these two conceptualizations, it is necessary to compare the image schema behind the Russian collocations corresponding to the English *in anger* and *out of anger* with the English containment image schema. Let us see how *in anger* transfers to Russian. As expected, *in anger* does not translate literally as *v*, meaning *in*, but as *s* in combination with the noun *anger* in the genitive case<sup>5</sup>, and meaning *with*. Respectively, *out of* does not translate literally as *iz*, but as *ot*, with the meaning *from*. If we take a look at our examples, it is clear that sentences including the preposition *ot* form two groups: *ot* in combination with the action schema, like in example a), and *ot* in combination with the occurrence schema, like in example b). The sentence in example c) belongs to the category of intense emotion:

47) **От злости** я плюнул в нее зубной щеткой вместе с пастой.

(**From (out of) anger** I spit the toothbrush along with toothpaste all over her.)

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<sup>5</sup> If the noun *anger* is in the instrumental case in combination with the preposition *s*, it changes its meaning. This is discussed in the next paragraph.

- 48) Воротников побледнел **от злости**, но постарался взять себя в руки.  
(Vorotnikov became white **from (with) anger**, but he managed to pull himself together.)
- 49) Она взяла и **со злости** заехала ему ногой между ног.  
(She suddenly **off (in) anger** kicked him between his legs.)

In order to explain the image schema behind intense emotion and the motive for reaction, we will focus on the *ot* in combination with the action schema group, and explain *ot* in combination with the occurrence schema group later. There are two reasons for translating *ot zlosti* in example d) as *out of anger* rather than as *in anger*. The first reason is based on the dictionary definition of the difference between *ot* and *s*, and the second reason is based on the notion of directedness which is explained below. Gramota.ru gives three definitions, out of which one is relevant for this study - the spatial one:

**ОТ** — С (предлоги)

**ОТ** — S (prepositions)


2. При обозначении пространства предлоги совпадают в общем значении направления действия, но различаются смысловыми оттенками. Ср.: *Туман поднимался от земли* (указывается только направление движения: туман мог уже не касаться земли). — *Туман поднимался с земли* (указывается отдаление от предшествующего соприкосновения с предметом).

(When denoting space, the two prepositions coincide in the general meaning of the direction of action, but differ in semantic nuances. Compare: *The fog lifted from the ground* (only the direction of the action is indicated: the fog could no longer touch the ground). — *The fog lifted off the ground* (distancing from previous contact with an object is indicated))


Since both *ot* and *s* indicate motion, it can be said that at the base of these two phrases lays the image of moving away from anger. The following figure depicts the difference in meaning between the two prepositions:

Figure 1

a) *ot zlosti*



b) *so zlosti*



If the square in Figure 1 stands for anger, the dotted circle for the experiencer at point A, the full circle for the experiencer at point B and the arrow for trajectory from point A to point B, then the Figure 1 a) illustrates the phrase *ot zlosti*, i.e. the instance of moving away from anger – it is clear that at some point in time the source of the motion was anger, but we should focus on the fact that there is some room between anger and the moving away. Taking into account Radden and Dirven's claim that the emotions expressed by emergence prepositions focus on the person's active and controlled part in determining their reaction by "leaving room" for the person's active part (Radden and Dirven 2007, 330), it can be said that this image schema proves that actions expressed by the phrase *ot zlosti* imply the experiencer's control over their actions when angry by leaving room between anger and action. Accordingly, sentences coded by formulation *ot zlosti* are a part of the motive group. On the other hand, Figure 1 b) highlights the touching point of anger and the action of moving away. Leaving no room for the experiencer to think through his or her actions, the experiencer acts while still being under the strong influence of anger, or rather while still being "touched" by it. This accounts for categorizing the phrase *so zlosti* as intense emotion "triggering reactions which are beyond a person's control," (Radden and Dirven 2007, 329) which is not motivated by the containment as in English (Radden and Dirven 2007, 329), but by the image schema of contact with the source.

The translation is also supported by Radden and Dirven's explanation of the spatial meaning of prepositions *on*, *off*, and *from* (Radden and Dirven 2007, 328). *On* is included in this explanation so that the translation of the preposition *s* could be justified and so that the image schema behind the preposition *s* in combination with anger in the genitive case could be explained. To continue, the one- and two-dimensionality of this group of prepositions is important. This means that one-dimensional prepositions see the landmark as a line and two-dimensional prepositions see it as a surface. It is also imperative to mention that *from* is zero-dimensional, meaning the landmark is in the shape of a point. Radden and Dirven claim that gravity is "the most natural situation of contact," (2007, 312) in which "a trajector vertically rests upon a landmark" and which is expressed by the preposition *on*. Furthermore, "situations in which a trajector touches a landmark sideways or from below are seen as instances of contact and expressed by *on* only if the trajector as a whole is somehow attached to the landmark," (2007, 312) for example, *the lamp is on the ceiling*, i.e. fixed to the ceiling. It is important that the trajector as a whole is in contact with the landmark, because the pair for *on* is the preposition *off*, which was used as a translation for the Russian preposition *s*. Therefore,

when being taken *off* something, it means the two objects have been in full contact. This contact with surface supports the claim that *so zlosti* is an instance of intense reaction to anger. In addition, Radden and Dirven state that *off* is a preposition which describes the separation of a trajector from the surface. (Radden and Dirven 2007, 328)

On the other hand, *from* is a zero-dimensional preposition that gives no importance to the shape of the landmark, and therefore no importance to the contact as well - it concentrates on the direction. In the situations described by *from*, the landmark is not in contact with the trajector as a whole, but by minimal means, like in *The lamp is hanging from the ceiling* (on a hook and chain) or *He did it from (out of) anger*.

If *from* and *out of* have different spatial meanings and invoke different image schemas, let us discuss if Russian *ot zlosti* (*from anger*) can be translated as English *out of anger*. Radden and Dirven emphasize the difference between *from*, which was explained above, and *out of*. (Radden and Dirven 2007, 313) While emergence from a container described by the zero-dimensional preposition *from* involves no intensity, the emergence of a trajector “from the depth of a container suggests greater effort.” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 313) This is why *from anger* belongs to group with lower control over anger in comparison to *out of anger*. The image schema differs and so does the conceptualization. Hence, *out of anger* is the closest variant of translation for *ot zlosti*, but is not an equivalent because it does not and cannot convey all of the nuances of the meaning of the source phrase. Bearing in mind the difference of the depth of the prepositions, it can be argued that this image schema is weaker than the containment schema in English. In conclusion, when Russian speakers talk about actions done intentionally while angry, the anger has less influence over them than it does over English speakers. The action does not come from the depths of anger, but from its surface.

Moreover, this difference can be explained in terms of direct and indirect causes. As the paper deals with researching emotions, the examples pertain to the category of causes triggering emotions, but as the contact with the source is the underlying image schema, it can be deduced that, on a more literal level, these are actually direct and indirect causes. The prepositions *ot* and *s* can be thought of as the preposition *from*, expressing indirect causes, and *of*, expressing direct causes, respectively. Radden and Dirven claim that “the most natural way of conceiving of cause and effect is in terms of SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema”, since “causes precede effects.” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 328) The notions of directedness and indirectness are explained in terms of the chains of causation, in which “the effect of a cause

may become the cause for another effect, etc.” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 328) As Radden and Dirven put it, “the preposition *of* is historically a reduced variant of spatial *off*, i.e. it derives from the sense of separation.” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 328) They speculate that the “notion of ‘contact’ accounts for its sense of direct cause.” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 328) This paper supports the claim that the meaning of the Russian preposition *s* has the same origins. Gramota.ru explains the preposition *s* in contrast with *ot* as follows: *s* “denotes moving away from the preceding contact with an object.” This contact is what accounts for the directedness of action in Russian sentences. In addition, the Russian spatial preposition *s* did not change through time the way the English spatial preposition *s* did, so this is certainly a spatial, as well as a causal, preposition. To continue, “the source preposition *from* is well-suited to express ultimate, i.e. typically indirect, causes”, considering “the source of a motion is the point that is farthest from the goal” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 328) as is the case with the Russian preposition *ot*, which was explained in Figure 1.

Native speakers of Russian support the conclusion that *ot zlosti* expresses controlled action and *so zlosti* a spontaneous one. A group of three native Russian speakers was asked if there was any difference between doing something *ot zlosti* and *so zlosti*. There were two complementing suggestions leading to the same conclusion: doing something *so zlosti* implies remorse afterwards and is usually said or done in the moment of anger, while doing something *ot zlosti* indicates making a decision based on the feeling of anger, without remorse, and can be done with time delay. The key concept is remorse, which indicates a lack or a presence of control. In addition, the sentence in the example c) has an element in Russian grammar which denotes “unexpected, sudden action” (Tolkoviy slovar Ozhegova) – *взять да* *u*, which was translated with the word *suddenly* and which indicates a lack of room for a thought through action and a lack of control.

#### *Reactions concomitant with emotions*

The sentences that belong to the occurrence schema and contain the accompaniment preposition *with* in the abstract space suggest emotions “co-occurring with their psychological reactions.” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 329) Therefore, in sentences with the preposition *with*, anger provokes concomitant, often physiological, reactions, e.g. getting red-faced or mute with anger, and not actions as in our examples with the container preposition *in* (e.g. saying something in anger). This type of reaction belongs to the second stage of the anger scenario and it is illustrated in the next example:

50) She peered at Jenn and Venus – one frozen in shock, the other **white with anger**.

Although Radden and Dirven do not explicitly explore the meaning of the concomitant preposition *with* at the level of control, it can be argued that anger expressed by the given preposition portrays a lack of experiencer's control over the emotion. This conclusion is based on the simultaneity of the emotion and the physiological reaction, which leaves no room for making a conscious decision. Furthermore, when writing about the emergence preposition *out of*, Radden and Dirven state that “emotions which do not leave room for a person's active part are not compatible with the notion of emergence” (Radden and Dirven 2007, 330) and give the following example: we cannot say “She grew white out of fury *but* [we can say] white with fury”. (2007, 330) Hence, the preposition *with* describes emotions which do not leave room for “the person's active part”, i.e. the control over the emotion.

The notion of concomitance can be explained on the metaphorical level, as well. The preposition *with* in combination with the occurrence schema implies the accompaniment schema. In the discussion of the accompaniment schema, the first thing we have to consider is the spatial notion of accompaniment and possession: what is close to us is our companion or our possession. (Heine 1997) Furthermore, Radden (1985) claims that “the main aspects that characterize companionship are a close connection and a certain amount of equivalence that these two object share.” (1985, 197) So, if someone *turns white with anger*, the conceptualized image schema is the one where both the experiencer and the anger turn white simultaneously, or rather concomitantly, as in Radden's example *His hair turned grey with age*, in which, as he explains, “age is viewed allegorically as man's steady companion who, due to their permanently being together, also exerts a certain influence upon him.” (Radden 1985, 197) People associate old age with grey hair, just as they associate the physical reaction of turning white with the emotion of anger.

The image schema for concomitant emotions differs in Russian. As mentioned above, there are two groups of sentences including the preposition *ot*. The preposition *ot* in combination with the occurrence schema, as in *Vorotnikov became white from (with) anger, but he managed to pull himself together* belongs to concomitant emotions which co-occur with physiological reactions and imply a lack of control over the experiencer's actions. (Radden and Dirven 2007, 330) In Russian, however, this can be explained in terms of the chain of causation. The preposition *ot* implies that anger is not the last in the chain of causing a person to become pale, i.e. to cause a physiological change. There is room between anger



and becoming pale. Consequently, in the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema, anger is the source, paleness is the goal, and the path is physiological reactions like not enough blood in the face.

### *Manner*

The abstract space of manner appears only in Russian. It expresses manner within the action schema and is coded as the noun *anger* in the instrumental case in combination with the preposition *s*, meaning *with*. Let us consider the following examples:

51) He turned white **with anger**.

52) «Все собирают деньги на выборы президента, даже те, кто в глаза его не видел», — как-то **со злостью** заметил мне крупный бизнесмен.

(“Everyone is collecting money for the presidential elections, even the people, who didn’t meet him,” – the large businessman remarked as if **with anger**.)

We have already explained that the preposition *with* denotes concomitant emotions when the abstract space takes place in the occurrence schema, and we mentioned above that the preposition *with* denotes manner within the action schema. This is important because the image schema changes depending on the event schema. We can test this by asking two simple questions: *Why did it happen?* and *How did it happen?* Sentences containing the occurrence schema answer the question *Why did it happen?* and imply the accompaniment schema, while the sentences containing the action schema answer the question *How did it happen?* and imply the instrument schema. (Radden and Dirven 2007) Hence, the occurrence schema expresses cause, while the action schema expresses manner. For this reason, this paper will be concerned with just two of the multiple meanings the preposition *with* conveys: cause and manner<sup>6</sup>.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) claim that *with* indicates both instrumentality and accompaniment because in English the conceptual system is construed by the metaphor AN INSTRUMENT IS A COMPANION. This conceptual metaphor is also coherent with Russian grammar, meaning that the same rules apply for the preposition *s* in Russian. The metaphor AN INSTRUMENT IS A COMPANION comes from children acting toward toys as companions. This explains why the preposition *with* expresses not only companionship, but instrumentality, as well.

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<sup>6</sup> The preposition *with* with the underlying companion metaphor conveys the following meanings: proximity in space, area, manner and instrument, circumstance, cause. (Dirven 1993, 80)

By analogy, if the manner of doing something is *with anger*, it can be done *without anger* as well, like in the following example:

53) Он сказал это совершенно без **злости**. Я его хлопнул по плечу, и мы пошли дальше.

He said it without (any) anger whatsoever.

As there is no schema in the abstract space denoting manner in our English examples, there are no examples which include the preposition *without*.

### 8.3. Questionnaire

During the questionnaire analysis it became obvious that respondents talked about several aspect of anger: intensity, negativity, cause, loss of control, acts of retribution, expressing anger, release of anger, physical effects and states. We have incorporated all of the aspects into the anger scenario (Kövecses 2002). Let us take a look at how we analyzed the responses in the following example:

54) **Anger** is the feeling of **overwhelming** animosity/frustration towards a certain person or object or idea which often **causes an irrational response**.

We found two stages of Kövecses' (2002) anger scenario in this example: stages four and five. The word *overwhelming* invites ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER metaphor, in which the level of tolerance for controlling anger is reached and the fluid pours over. Stage five of the anger scenario includes an act of retribution, which is in our case an irrational response.

We analyzed the Russian examples, like the following one, in the same way:

55) Злость - это эмоция, человеческая **реакция, раздражение в ответ на** неудовлетворённость чем-либо.

(Anger is an emotion, a human **reaction, irritation as a response to** not being satisfied with something.)

We found three stages of the anger schema in this example: stages one, two and five. Anger causes a reaction, i.e. some kind of retribution. This is stage four. Irritation is a physiological effect a person feels when angry; therefore, this is stage 2. The construction *as a response to* indicates a cause for anger. Not being satisfied with something implies the first anger scenario.

There were also non-typical scenarios, like positive anger in the following example:

56) Emotion secondary to sadness, probably **healthy** to an extent.

In Russian there were non-prototypical examples of positive anger, as well:

57) И в умеренных количествах не влечет за собой **ничего плохого**, и **помогает** человеку выплеснуть свои эмоции, несет в себе своеобразную разрядку для организма.

(In moderate quantity it **does not cause anything bad** and **helps us** to take out our emotions; it implies a kind of body discharge.)

There were no examples for the stage three of the anger scenario – the attempt at control. This was expected as there were scarce examples for this scenario stage in the corpora research, as well. The rest of the respondent answers can be found in the appendix.

## 9. General discussion


### 9.1. The corpus study

There were several hypotheses we wanted to test. In order to do so, we firstly counted the percentage of all event schemas and abstract space. Then we decided which schemas belong to which stage of the anger scenario. In the end, we counted the percentage of all instances of the control aspect.

#### *The control aspect*

We have argued that the schemas that show control over anger are more salient in Russian than they are in English based on a research which showed that in Russian controlled anger metaphors are more salient than in English. (Kövecses 2002) The results of our research are shown in Diagram 1.

**Diagram 1** The aspect of control over anger in Russian and English




We have counted 41 sentences expressing the control aspect in English, and 66 in Russian, which leads to the conclusion that Russian speakers are more prone to talk about the control aspect of anger. In English, control over anger was established in 33% of cases, while in Russian, it was 38%. Sentences which indicate loss of control and no ability to control anger accounted for 67% of English examples, and 62% in Russian. In both languages no control over anger is more salient than the control of anger, which is expected because no control over anger belongs to the prototypical anger scenario, while control over anger is not a prototypical model in either language. Nevertheless, the salience of the control over anger is higher by 5% for Russian, and the salience of the lack of control aspect is 5% higher in English. This confirms the hypothesis 5 (The schemas that show control over anger are more salient in Russian than they are in English) and shows that metaphorical and grammatical analyses complement each other in the cognitive linguistic research of the concept of *anger*. Moreover, these results are compatible with the broader cultural context explained by Ogarkova and Soriano (2014). They explain that Russian society is more collectivistic and because of that Russian speakers conceptualize anger as an emotion disruptive of the society, which motivates them to speak about *anger* as a controlled emotion, more than some other societies, like the American society, which is more individualistic and not so concerned with the disruptive nature of anger to the society. The notion of society is of great importance in

this explanation, because culture is a social construct, and so is language. Language, although subjective, it is intersubjective, i.e. social, as well. (Bartmiński 2009, 23) According to Bartmiński, language “unites people in a given social environment, creates a community of thoughts, feelings and values” (Bartmiński 2009, 23) and “influences (...) the perception and understanding of the social situation by a member of the community.” (Bartmiński 2009, 23) Therefore, language reflects the social values embedded in a culture.

### *The anger scenario*

This section discusses the anger scenario, which is depicted in the Diagram 2.

**Diagram 2** The stages of the prototypical anger scenario in corpora



We wanted to prove the hypothesis that the second stage of Kövecses’ anger scenario, which includes experiencing the physiological effects of *anger*, is richer in content than in English. This hypothesis is based on the claim that the Russian concept of anger is more embodied than the English concept. (Wierzbicka 1992) The hypothesis was confirmed: in English, the second stage of the scenario consists of 28% of examples, while in Russian it consists of 33% of examples. The results are in accordance with several clinical studies mentioned in Ogarkova and Soriano (2014), which report Russian patients with depression describing their symptoms more somatically than the patients who spoke English. During the research, we have found more convincing evidence that the concept of anger is indeed more embodied in Russian than it is in English. Table 1 shows that 4% of examples denote the

concomitant emotion schema in English, and 17% of examples denote the concomitant emotion schema in Russian, which is indicative of the concept of *anger* being more embodied in Russian, than it is in English.

We also proposed that there would be a difference in the elaboration of the anger scenario in English and in Russian. The most noticeable differences arise in the first and third stages of the scenario, as well as in the non-prototypical cases of anger. In English, the first stage (the offending event) and the third stage (attempt at control) are much more elaborated than in Russian. This can mean that the American speakers, when thinking about anger, think of its causes and the ways in which they can control themselves in these kinds of situations. On the other hand, all of the remaining stages were more prominent in Russian than they were in English. We have already mentioned that the reason for the better elaboration of the second stage is the embodiment of the concept of *anger*. Russian speakers, on the other hand, concentrate on the loss of control and its consequences. This can also be explained in terms of the collectivistic and individualistic nature of the two societies. Americans, as an individualistic society, think of what can provoke anger in them and how they can control it as individuals, while Russians concentrate on the negative effects of the loss of control caused by anger. This can be explained in terms of metaphor as well. Kövecses (2000) states that Russian metaphors emphasize the negativity of anger more than English metaphors do. If negativity denotes the loss of control over anger, as well as the negative consequences it implies, then these stages should be more elaborated in Russian than they are in English.

To continue, there is a significantly bigger number of examples of non-prototypical *anger* in Russian, than there is in English. This is so because of two reasons: firstly, controllable anger is non-prototypical and it is more salient in Russian than it is in English, and secondly, there are several categories in Russian which do not exist in English: manner and anger as energy. Manner belongs to abstract space and takes up 13% of the examples in Russian. It describes controllable anger, similarly to the emergence metaphor, but it is motivated by the accompaniment schema.

Moreover, we have found several instances of the conceptualization of anger as the flow of energy. They appear in the transfer schema and in the constructive use of anger. Let us take a look at the following example:

58) И **злость** потом **перенес** на безвинного Малецкого, хотя надо бы подивиться в очередной раз вывороченности человеческой психики.

(He then **transferred** the **anger** to innocent Maletsky, which calls for at least a regular act of surprise at the perversity of human mind.)

Here anger is conceptualized as a reified substance which can be transferred unintentionally, like energy. In the transformation schema, on the other hand, anger, as a form of negative energy, transforms into some kind of positive agitation or competitiveness in sports or even in strength, which is then put to constructive use, like in the above-mentioned example:

28) Члены вашего фан-клуба утверждают, что когда вы злитесь, вы раздеваетесь до трусов и ваша **злость становится спортивной**.

(The members of your fan-club confirmed that you undress to your underpants when you're angry and your **anger then turns into agitation**.)

In both English and Russian there are examples of positive anger and the controlled expression of anger. However, there is a difference in the conceptualization of the controlled expression of anger. Russian speakers conceptualize it as the release of anger, like in the above-mentioned example:

15) Жена от него ушла, с работы выгнали, **злость вымещает** на матери. (His wife left him, they fired him, and now he **takes it (anger) out** on his mother.)

On the other hand, in English, anger is expressed and neutral. It can be non-metaphorical, like in the collocation *to express anger*, and it can be metaphorical, like in the collocation *to vent anger*, which implies the HOT LIQUID IN A CONTAINER METAPHOR and the release of pressure, which hurts no one and benefits the experiencer.

The fifth stage, the act of retribution, is more prominent in Russian than it is in English, which reflects the claim that Russian speakers talk about emotions as about active processes expressed in a number of external behaviors (Pavlenko 2002).

#### *Event schemas and abstract space*

The remaining hypotheses are related to the event schemas and abstract space. Based on Pavlenko's (2002) study which showed that Russian speakers talk about emotions as active processes expressed as external behavior, we proposed that the emotions triggering reactions are more numerous in Russian than in English. The same study showed that American speakers talk about emotions primarily as about states, so we argue that states and the location

schema within the occurrence schema are more salient in English than they are in Russian. Both hypotheses were confirmed. Emotions considering reactions take up 27% of Russian examples, while in English they take up only 10% of examples. States and the location schema take up 13% of English examples, while in Russian they take up only 5%. By testing all of our hypotheses, we have included all of the event schemas and the schemas belonging to abstract space in our analysis. More detailed differences in the schemas are shown in Table 1 below.

**Table 1** Event schemas and abstract space in percentages

SCHEMA	ENGLISH	RUSSIAN
<b>EVENT SCHEMAS</b>	83%	60%
<b>FORCE-DYNAMIC WORLD</b>	26%	30%
ACTION SCHEMA	29%	19%
a) anger as agent	7%	9%
➤ <i>anger as agent-like cause</i>	4%	3%
➤ <i>anger as agent</i>	2%	5%
b) anger as theme	22%	10%
➤ <i>controlling anger</i>	2%	1%
➤ <i>expressing anger/release of anger</i>	4%	3%
➤ <i>provoking anger</i>	8%	4%
➤ <i>(failed) attempt to control anger</i>	8%	1%
SELF-MOTION SCHEMA	-	4%
CAUSED MOTION SCHEMA	3%	4%
TRANSFER SCHEMA	-	3%
<b>MATERIAL WORLD</b>	41%	25%
OCCURRENCE SCHEMA	31%	19%
a) states	7%	1%
b) steady processes	6%	3%
c) processes	19%	14%
gradual:	10%	7%
➤ <i>growing anger</i>	4%	4%
➤ <i>receding anger</i>	4%	2%
abrupt:	9%	8%




➤ <i>growing anger</i>	7%	3%
➤ <i>receding anger</i>	2%	4%
POSSESSION SCHEMA	4%	2%
a) possessor	1%	1%
b) possessed	3%	1%
LOCATION SCHEMA	6%	4%
<b>PSYCHOLOGICAL WORLD</b>	10%	4%
EMOTION SCHEMA	7%	3%
PERCEPTION SCHEMA	-	1%
COGNITION SCHEMA	3%	-
<b>ABSTRACT SPACE</b>	17%	40%
INDIRECT CAUSE	1%	-
CAUSES TRIGGERING EMOTION	6%	-
EMOTIONS TRIGGERING REACTIONS	10%	27%
a) intense emotion	3%	5%
b) motive	2%	4%
c) concomitant emotion	4%	17%
MANNER	-	13%
<b>TOTAL NUMBER OF EXAMPLES</b>	<b>90 = 100%</b>	<b>92 = 100%</b>

## 9.2. The questionnaire

After analyzing the respondents' answers, we have found 37 examples that we have incorporated into the anger scenario in English, and 42 examples in Russian. The results are shown below, in Diagram 3. The questionnaire anger scenario is in accordance with the corpora anger scenario, except for the fourth stage. In this way we have confirmed the hypotheses from the corpora research. We have found that our group of American speakers elaborated the offending event, which is the cause of anger, 20% more than our group of Russian speakers. The third stage, attempt at control, was not discussed by any of the participants.

**Diagram 3** The stages of the prototypical anger scenario in the questionnaire



The fourth stage, loss of control, leaves room for further discussion, as it does not mirror the anger scenario from the corpora. We have explained the loss of control in two ways. Firstly, Russian speakers may elaborate loss of control more because they focus on the negative aspects of anger due to their collectivistic mindset. Secondly, we have claimed that schemas that show loss of control over anger are more salient in Russian than they are in English (hypothesis 6) because of Ogarkova and Soriano's finding (2014) that Russian metaphors emphasize the negativity of anger more than English metaphors do, which we have confirmed in the corpora analysis.. The results are visible in Diagram 1. Nevertheless, the questionnaire results suggest that the 4<sup>th</sup> stage of anger scenario, loss of control, is more elaborated by American speakers than it is by Russian speakers. In other words, when asked about anger, American speakers elaborate loss of control more because they focus on the negative aspects of anger perhaps due to historical reasons. (cf. Stearns 1994 as quoted in Kövecses 2000a, 169) Russian speakers, on the other hand, write about 2<sup>nd</sup> stage, i.e. the bodily experience of anger, and about 5<sup>th</sup> stage, i.e. retribution. Due to the importance of the embodiment and the perception of emotions as active processes expressed in a number of external behaviors (Pavlenko 2002) in Russian culture, Russian speakers focus less on the loss of control when asked about anger. Because the reasons for the incongruity in 4<sup>th</sup> stage of the anger scenario are unclear, we suggest further research in the fields of control and loss of control over anger.

Another hypothesis which is confirmed by the questionnaire analysis is that the second stage of the anger scenario is more elaborated in Russian than it is in English, making the Russian experience of anger more embodied than in English. This opens up space for the more prominent fifth stage, the act of retribution, in Russian, as Russian speakers talk about emotions as about active processes expressed in a number of external behaviors (Pavlenko 2002).

The non-prototypical stages of anger are more prominent and more various in Russian than they are in English. While American speakers talk about positive anger, Russian speakers add the manipulative use of anger and talk about anger in terms of energy, which is more prototypical for Eastern cultures. (Kövecses 2000)

## 10. Conclusion

The relationship between language, mind and culture has been intriguing the minds of linguists, anthropologists, psychologists and other researchers for over a century. In the recent years, extensive research in various linguistic disciplines was conducted on emotions, as they are a prolific field for the research of language and mind. Conceptual metaphor has always had a crucial role in cognitive linguistic research, but recently some light has been shed on the importance of grammar in such studies. Bearing in mind that language consists of both metaphorical and non-metaphorical expressions, this paper presents a semantic-grammatical analysis of the concept of anger in English and in Russian. As the cognitive model of anger for English has been defined, this paper focuses on the cross-cultural variations of the concept of anger in English and in Russian.

The study found that English and Russian share a vast majority of event schemas, and that they are somewhat different in the structure of non-participant roles. The main differences were found in the frequencies and elaborations of different event schemas and non-participant roles, as well as in the elaboration of the anger scenario. Russian speakers focus more on non-participant roles than English speakers do, whereas English speakers focus more on event schemas. They emphasize the offending event and loss of control, while Russian speakers more often talk about physiological effects of anger and retribution acts. By the means of semantic-grammatical analysis, the study has shown that a connection between language and the conceptualization of concepts embedded in culture exists.

Since emotions are a vast field of research, this study gives only a glance into anger/*zlost* cross-cultural variety. In order to elaborate the concept of anger/*zlost* in more detail, future research should include the analysis of the first semantic-grammatical level in corpora and in the language of native speakers, as well as a greater number of examples. Another interesting notion for further research is the interdependence of and the connection between control over anger and the loss of control. To get a greater picture of this complex emotion, more connections need to be made between the linguistic and psychological research. In this light, the given study represents a small part of what should be an extensive, detailed research into the concept of anger/*zlost*.

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