Ruščić, Valentina.
(2017).
The problem of social contract in Hobbes's and Rawls's political philosophy.
Diploma Thesis. Filozofski fakultet u Zagrebu, Department of Philosophy.
[mentor Raunić, Raul].
Abstract
The goal of this thesis is to compare two different political theories – Hobbes’s absolutism and Rawls’s liberal theory – by analyzing the key moments of their social contract theories. Hobbes’s social contract which is made out of fear, is exclusively a result of human rationality. It leads to the establishment of an absolute monarchy as a prerequisite for a peaceful, stable and safe civil life and legitimizes political authority. Rawls considers constitutional democracy to be the ideal political system which would ensure the stability of the order with the help of the regulatory principles of justice as fairness which are intended for the basic structure of society. Justice is the basic virtue of the basic structure and its principles have been adopted in fair conditions among free and equal citizens, which include not only the aspect of rationality, but also reasonableness. The political concept of justice is ideal for the preservation of the basic virtues of the liberal society, freedom, equality among individuals and the preservation of decent life. This comparison gives us an insight into the answers which two greats of political philosophy, one passionate advocate of absolutism, the other a defender of liberalism, offer by means of two opposing political theories regarding fundamental questions of the philosophy of politics such as the issue of stability, the necessity of establishing a state, legitimization of government and its reach, freedom and equality of citizens, as well as justice.
Item Type: |
Diploma Thesis
|
Uncontrolled Keywords: |
social contract, legitimacy, political government, liberty, justice |
Subjects: |
Philosophy |
Departments: |
Department of Philosophy |
Supervisor: |
Raunić, Raul |
Date Deposited: |
07 Feb 2018 15:57 |
Last Modified: |
07 Feb 2018 15:57 |
URI: |
http://darhiv.ffzg.unizg.hr/id/eprint/9490 |
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